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WHEN GOOD INTENTIONS ARE NOT
ENOUGH: PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
AND THE IMPENDING CRISIS
OF LEGITIMACY
Timothy Casey *
Nearly 1700 "problem-solving courts" are currently in planning or
operation in the United States. These specialized, alternative courts
form at intersections of criminal justice and social policy. While drug
courts comprise an overwhelming majority of these courts, specialized
courts also address issues of mental health and domestic violence.
These courts, collectively known as problem-solving courts, share a
central principle: endorsement of the use of judicial power to coerce
various programs of treatment.
The problem-solving courts represent a dramatic change in the
function of the criminal courts, incorporating an experimentalist the-
ory of governance, where evolving standards, continuous monitoring
and collaboration replace existing structures. The procedural due pro-
cess protections accorded to criminal defendants and traditional barri-
ers to the use of coercion are eliminated, as the adversarial process is
abandoned in favor of a collaborative endeavor involving the judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney, probation officer, treatment provider and
defendant. Significantly, the judge becomes part of the treatment
team, rendering decisions not based on law or fact, but on a program
of clinical treatment.
What happens when a judge changes from the traditional role of
neutral arbiter to a new role as active participant in an ongoing pro-
cess? Experimentalist governance offers an attractive and pragmatic
solution to vexing social problems; when applied to the criminal jus-
tice system, legitimacy becomes critical to both the acceptance and the
success of institutional reform. This paper describes the problem-solv-
ing court model, outlines the experimentalist features, and notes the
similarities between current models and original juvenile courts one
hundred years ago. The legitimacy challenges faced by the juvenile
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courts forecast impending difficulty for the problem-solving courts.
An analysis of the legitimacy of problem-solving courts questions the
long-term viability of the current "problem solving" mutation of the
criminal courts. Finally, a case study of a recently implemented prob-
lem-solving court suggests that the experimentalist structure of these
courts can, and should, be utilized to enhance the legitimacy of the
problem-solving courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM SOLVING MODEL
The ideals that keep a social institution alive and functioning are
never perceived with complete clarity so that even if there is no fail-
ure of good intentions, the existent institution will never be quite
what it might have been had it been supported by a clearer insight
into its guiding principles.'
HE problem-solving courts have been described as experimental-
ist institutions, founded on a "new" theory of governance-demo-
cratic experimentalism. 2 Democratic experimentalism rejects
formalist institutions and static standards in favor of a system of rolling
standards where efficient results are achieved through collaborative mon-
itoring and a schedule of sanctions and rewards.3
1. Professor Lon Fuller describes the difficulty of sustaining legitimacy in decision-
making institutions. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1959) (draft pre-
pared for Jurisprudence course, on file with the Columbia Law Library). Edited version
available at 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 356 (1978).
2. Charles Sabel & Michael Dorf, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimen-
talist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf & Sabel, Drug
Courts].
3. See supra note 2, Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts, at 841-42; Michael Dorf & Charles
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM L. REv. 267, 349 (1999);
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Problem-solving courts employ the institution of the judiciary to solve
socio-legal or public policy problems through the courts. These "alterna-
tive" courts have found a toehold where existing social or legal institu-
tions have proven woefully inadequate or have failed altogether.4
Problem-solving courts address juvenile delinquency, drug abuse, domes-
tic violence, and mental health by promoting programs of treatment de-
signed to address the root causes of criminal behavior. In each of these
contexts, treatment presents an attractive alternative to the standard
criminal justice system. 5 The focus on treatment means that these courts
rely heavily on social and medical science for guidance in the definition,
diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, and cure of sickness or disorder.6
The problem solving model changes the structure of the court with re-
spect to what is decided and who makes the decision. For most problem-
solving courts, the relevant issue is not guilt, but rather who is entitled to
treatment and whether the treatment is "successful." The discretionary
authority of the judge expands in problem-solving courts because treat-
ment decisions require the judge to rely on extralegal authorities, such as
medical or social science.7 Further, the judge shares decision-making re-
sponsibilities with the other participants in the court. In many instances,
clinical experts and treatment providers play a significant role in deter-
Charles Sabel, A Quiet Revolution of Democratic Governance: Towards Democratic Exper-
imentalism, in GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 123 (2001); Archon Fung, Bradley
Karkkainen & Charles Sabel, After Backyard Environmentalism: Toward a Performance
Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 690 (2000); James
Liebman & Charles Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: the Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183,
184 (2003); Charles Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Liti-
gation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2004).
4. The problem solving model flourishes at intersections of criminal law and social
policy, and in categories of cases where criminal convictions are either difficult to obtain or
unfair to enforce.
5. For example, it seems unfair to punish children in the same manner as adults, even
when they commit the same act. Likewise, in cases where drug offenses are related to a
defendant's addiction, it seems unfair to impose long prison sentences. In some cases, it
may be difficult to establish a culpable mens rea where the defendant suffers from a mental
illness. And in many domestic violence cases it is difficult to maintain a cooperative rela-
tionship between complainants and prosecutors where a conviction will result in a jail
sentence.
6. The increased reliance on treatment might signify a resurgence of the "rehabilita-
tive ideal." See generally FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
(1983) (describing the shift, beginning in the early 1970s, away from the general acceptance
of rehabilitation as a recognized penal goal). But note that the problem-solving courts
promote "treatment" in a limited number of circumstances, and only as a qualified excep-
tion, rather than as a default rule. It would be difficult to infer from the proliferation of
these courts a wholesale resurgence of the rehabilitative ideal. More likely, they represent
further evidence of its decline. By isolating the most sympathetic classes of criminal cases,
they provide an answer to the perceived injustice stemming from non-discretionary sen-
tencing standards.
7. Of course many decisions rely on social or medical science, and it is not new to
suggest that social science has gained recognition as a type of authority along with common
law precedent or statutory materials. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 469 (1897); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908); Brown v. Board, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see generally JOHN MONAGHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE IN LAW (The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988).
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mining whether a program is working and whether a participant is non-
compliant. 8 The expanded discretion and the dilution of power might be
of less concern in civil proceedings, but problem-solving courts are tied to
criminal proceedings, and non-compliance with a treatment plan results
in the criminal penalty of loss of liberty. Further, the problem-solving
courts openly advocate the use of coercion as a permissible, and neces-
sary, component of successful treatment. 9
By permitting judges to step out of the role of neutral arbiter, problem-
solving courts differ from traditional courts in ways that arguably define
the essential nature of a court.10 Professor Abram Chayes described the
difference between the traditional roles of a court and the roles that
courts assumed in large-scale public law litigations." The Chayesian
description provides a standard against which the problem solving model
can be compared. A traditional court includes a retrospective view, an
adversarial environment, a reliance on positive law, a static operational
model, appellate review, and a primarily adjudicative function. 12 Prob-
lem-solving courts, on the other hand, include a prospective view, collab-
orative environment, reliance on sociological theory, an adaptive
operational model, no appellate review, and a primarily therapeutic
function. 13
Espousing a collaborative approach, problem solving judges actively
participate in the recovery process alongside attorneys, social workers
and treatment providers. 14 These significant differences raise questions
8. Although social science and medical science frequently visit the traditional court-
room, the science is normally used instrumentally, as a means to determine a particular
legal fact or issue. With the problem-solving courts, however, the science is the end-pur-
pose of the court.
9. An article by three well-known advocates of the drug treatment courts describes
the role of coercion: "The procedures of the treatment program reflect the premise that the
DTC [drug treatment court] utilizes the coercive power of the court to encourage the of-
fender to succeed in completing the treatment program." Peggy Fulton-Hora, William G.
Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 475-76 (1999) [hereinafter, Fulton-Hora,
et al.].
10. Professor Chayes described the features of traditional courts. Abram Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1283-84 (1976).
Chayes's account of the changes to the judiciary provided evidence that the shift to a more
discretionary judiciary was not a new development. Id.; see also infra Section I, for a dis-
cussion of the same type of judicial discretion in the juvenile courts over a hundred years
ago.
11. Chayes, supra note 10, at 1283-84.
12. Id.
13. The key components of a problem-solving court are the integration of treatment
services into the criminal justice system through a nonadversarial, collaborative approach.
2000 Drug Court Survey Report. Part P Judicial Perspectives. OJP Clearinghouse and Tech-
nical Assistance Project. American University, October 2001, at 66 (Draft, available at
http://spa.american.edu/justice/documentviewer.asp?ID=379.); see also Fulton-Hora et al.,
supra note 9, at 476.
14. The active role of the judge differs from the traditional interaction between crimi-
nal courts and treatment programs because the judge is not separated from the treatment
program. For example, a traditional court might sentence X to probation, with the express
condition that X enter and complete a drug program. If the Department of Probation
2004] 1463
SMU LAW REVIEW
of whether problem-solving courts are courts at all, 15 and whether the
proliferation of this new image of judicial temperament will affect per-
ceptions of legitimacy of the courts.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOMINANT PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURT MODELS: JUVENILE COURTS
AND DRUG COURTS
The drug treatment courts increase the discretionary power of the
judge. Claims that the shift to a discretionary role for judges is a recent
phenomenon ignore the history of another system of discretionary, treat-
ment-based judging: the juvenile courts. In many ways, the juvenile
courts were the original problem-solving courts and any discussion of
modern forms of discretionary judging should include reference to the
history of the juvenile courts. That history foreshadows the challenges
for modern problem-solving courts, and provides a cautionary tale of the
pitfalls to a discretionary approach.
Similar factors contributed to the development of two dominant mod-
els of problem-solving courts. The juvenile courts were seen as a way to
efficiently handle the increased numbers of cases involving children. The
drug courts emerged from a criminal system plagued by the collateral
damage from a war on drugs. Increases in the number of drug cases coin-
cided with legislatively mandated increases in the sentences imposed for
cases and restrictions on plea bargaining, such that cases that previously
would have settled were litigated furiously.
Both juvenile courts and drug courts emerged concurrently with new
scientific theories and shifts in jurisprudential thought. For juvenile
courts, the scientific study of causes of criminality merged with a sense of
societal responsibility for children. The acceptance of the idea that the
state could or should benevolently intervene on behalf of children-that
the state should act en loco parens-justified separating juveniles from
adult offenders. 16 The problems of dependent children and delinquent
children were perceived through the same lens-both required the state
to accept responsibility as parens patriae. For drug courts, the disease
alleges that X did not comply with the terms of probation, then the case would come
before the judge again. The judge might hear witnesses from the department of probation
or from the treatment facility in order to determine the legal issue of whether X violated
the terms of his probation. In the problem-solving courts, however, the judge herself helps
to decide what type of program is best for X. If the defendant does not succeed, then the
judge, along with others, will decide that X has failed. The judge thus becomes part of the
treatment.
15. Indeed, a number of scholarly commentators have noted that problem-solving
courts look more like administrative agencies than courts. See Michael Dorf, Legal Inde-
terminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 948 (2003) [hereinafter Dorf,
Indeterminacy].
16. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106-07 (1909); see gener-
ally David Tanenhaus, Policing the Child: Juvenile Justice in Chicago, 1870-1925 (1997)
(doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, Department of History) (copy on file with
the author) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, Policing the Child]; Michael Willrich, City of Courts:
Socializing Justice in Progressive Era Chicago 209 (2003).
1464 [Vol. 57
When Good Intentions Are Not Enough
theory of addiction, based on the idea that drug addiction is a medical, as
opposed to a penological, problem led to the adoption of treatment as an
alternative to incarceration. Both models benefited from changing shifts
in popular jurisprudential theory, providing judges with a theoretically
reasoned justification for their actions. Juvenile courts adopted sociologi-
cal jurisprudence, and the drug courts, therapeutic jurisprudence. 17
The development of both models is marked by the extraordinary con-
tributions of a few dynamic individuals who, by virtue of their "cha-
risma," were able to navigate the treacherous waters created by the
volatile combination of treatment and punishment theories. Finally, both
courts obtained political consensus and financial support from diverse
sources.
A. JUVENILE COURTS
1. The Legal Prehistory
A brief exploration of the era preceding the emergence of the juvenile
courts evidences the deep philosophical divide over the proper interven-
tionary role of the state into the lives of citizens. Antebellum America
struggled with the manner in which the government could or should inter-
vene in private lives, even where the intrusion was intended to guarantee
basic human rights. The legislative and judicial actions in the post-Civil
War era highlight the tension between a traditional notion of noninterfer-
ence and a new recognition of the state as the proper authority to guaran-
tee the welfare and basic rights of its citizens.18 State interaction with
children echoed wider concerns about balancing individual liberty and so-
cial policy, and long before the formal establishment of specialized juve-
nile courts, the courts played an integral part in demarcating the
appropriate limits of state intervention.
In the mid-1800s, problems with juveniles, whether based on depen-
dency or delinquency, were usually resolved with commitment to
mandatory reform schools. Commitment proceedings were informal and
usually final. Complaints about the lack of procedure and claims of arbi-
trariness were increasingly taken to the courts. Initially, the decisions re-
flected a preference for the individual liberty interests of the child and
the family over the interests of the state. For example, in 1869, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court granted sixteen writs of habeas corpus mandating
the release of children who had been committed to reformatory
17. While therapeutic jurisprudence is not a dominant theory, it is one onto which the
problem-solving courts have attached. Moreover, other jurisprudential theories, such as
restorative justice, might apply at least as well as therapeutic jurisprudence. See generally
JAMES D. NOLAN, DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE (2002); JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002).
18. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV; Civil Rights Act of 1866 (vetoed by President
Johnson); Civil Rights Act of 1875, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down the
Civil Rights Act of 1875). These same issues resurfaced in the aftermath of In re Gault, 387




In 1870, a landmark Illinois case, Ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, over-
turned the statute that authorized a child's commitment to the reforma-
tory institution for as long as the institution believed the commitment
necessary. 20 The petition on behalf of the committed boy relied on the
equal protection provisions of the newly enacted Illinois Constitution.2 1
The court held that the child was an "individual" within the meaning of
the constitution, and therefore accrued all of the civil rights and liberties
guaranteed thereunder, including the right to be free from indiscriminate
detention. 22 Both the Turner decision and the prevalence of habeas peti-
tions reflected national sentiments regarding the importance of individual
liberty.2 3
In the decades that followed the Turner decision, however, new public
policies led to a reordering of liberty interests and social goals. The de-
bate over mandatory public education marked a shift in favor of social
policy over individual determinism with respect to juveniles, and fore-
shadowed the idea that the state was responsible for the well-being of its
children.24 In In re Ferrier,25 the Illinois Supreme Court retreated from
the rights-based reasoning in Turner, favoring instead a rationale based
on the state as parens patriae. In Ferrier, a nine-year-old girl was found
truant and dependent.2 6 Because the statute then in effect called for a
trial by six jurors, instead of twelve, the girl contended that her commit-
ment to an "industrial school" violated due process. 27 The court held that
19. Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra note 16, at 21 (citing CHICAGO REFORM
SCHOOL ANNUAL REPORTS, Fourteenth Annual Report at 6).
20. 55 Ill. 280 (1870).
21. Id. at 288. The Illinois Constitution contained provisions analogous to the Federal
Constitution. The state constitution, however, went far beyond the federal constitution in
the delineation of individual rights. Petitioner cited the right against deprivation of "life
liberty or property without due process of law," and the "right of trial by jury." ILL.
CONST., art II, §§ 2, 5 (1870). Petitioner also cited the right to penalty "proportioned to the
offense," and the right to find a "certain remedy in the law for all injuries and wrongs."
ILL. CONST., art. II, §§ 2, 19. See Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra, note 16, at 36, citing
Brief of Petitioner.
22. Turner, 55 I11. at 281.
23. Historically, the late 1860s and early 1870s reflect a period of optimism in the
Reconstruction, where measures (13, 14 and 15th Amendments, Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1875, debates over universal suffrage) were undertaken to insure the equal protection
of all individuals under the law. Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra note 16, at 26-30. See
HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPI-
NESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED, 190-97 (1865) (children enjoy basic
rights to liberty). See also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (1969-1970).
24. See In re Ferrier, 103 II. 367 (1882) (recognizing the idea of patens patriae, and
finding an industrial school constitutional by distinguishing criminal and chancery proceed-
ings). Similar debates occurred in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Milwaukee Indus. Sch. v.
Supervisor of Milwaukee County., 40 Wisc. 328, 337, 371-72 (1876); Prescott v. State, 19
Ohio St. 184, 187-88 (1869); Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869).
25. Ferrier, 103 II1. at 371. Cf., Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1839).
26. Ferrier, 103 Ill. at 368.
27. The statute in question, An Act to Aid Industrial Schools for Girls, (1879), was
passed in the aftermath of the Turner case, which invalidated the existing statute as
unconstitutional.
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the state's position "of parens patirae" to the child imposed a duty to
restrain her liberty interests where "the child's welfare and the good of
the community manifestly require. ' 28 While Turner had cast juveniles as
individuals in the eyes of the state, the importance of developing an edu-
cated society meant that the state should impinge on the liberty of chil-
dren for their own and society's future good.
In Chicago, and other industrial centers, children were increasingly rel-
egated to "almshouses," private placement centers, and the jails.29 The
growing numbers of children in jails, or otherwise detained, became espe-
cially problematic in the industrialized urban centers, with immigrant and
poor children disproportionately affected.30 A growing progressive
movement sought change using two policy arguments: first, the state
should undertake the education and support of dependent children; and
second, the existing, predominantly Protestant, moral order of society
should be preserved. In Chicago, Jane Addams, the founder of Hull
House and a proponent of education for children, became the dominant
voice for education-based reform. The Juvenile Protection Associations,
often staffed by the wives of prominent politicians and businessmen, fur-
thered Protestant ideals of morality.31
In sum, the juvenile courts emerged from an era characterized by the
demarcation of the line of appropriate government intervention into the
private lives of its citizens, especially where the intervention was seen as
necessary to protect fundamental rights or to advance social policy. More
specifically, the juvenile courts appeared at a time when sentiments seem
to have shifted in favor of the advancement of social goals such as univer-
sal education, integration of immigrant populations, and development of
a sustainable industrial workforce within the traditional moral and social
framework. Finally, the late nineteenth century saw a dramatic increase
in the power of the judiciary.32 As large-scale disputes found settlement
only in the courts, the role of courts as ultimate decision-maker became
increasingly socially accepted. These trends converged to create an op-
portunity for the judiciary to extend its influence into the social fabric of
society.
28. In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. at 368.
29. See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUS-
TICE (Margaret Resenheim et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, Juvenile Courts].
30. Id.; see also Michael Willrich, City of Courts (2003), supra note 16. Willrich noted
the dramatic increase in immigration to Chicago around the turn of the century, and the
emergence of dance halls as hotspots of social interaction among immigrant populations.
Id. at xxx.
31. Willrich, supra note 16, at 208.
32. The decisions of the Supreme Court in overruling acts of Congress and state legis-
latures represented a flexing of judicial power. The trend began in the post Civil War years
and culminated with Roosevelt's court packing scheme.
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2. The Emergence of Social Science and Sociological Theory
Science provided a rationale for state intervention through the courts.
The widespread acceptance of the scientific method as the blueprint for
rational analysis led to an application of scientific analysis to new and
previously untouched fields of study. Human behavior became increas-
ingly subjected to study and analysis, and theories of causation devel-
oped, particularly in the field of criminal behavior.
Influenced by social Darwinism and European criminal theory, the
idea of predisposition to criminality gained momentum in America. The
ideas of Cesare Lombroso-particularly the concept of criminal pheno-
types-were seized upon by budding American criminologists to confirm
preexisting suspicions of a "criminal class."'33 Although Lombroso ac-
knowledged the effect of social conditions, the dominant view of his work
did not include reference to non-biological factors. 34 The treatment of
criminality as one of biological determinism fit nicely within a larger vi-
sion of science as an operation of identification and classification. 35 Logi-
cal inference permitted leaps from biological determinism to eugenics
and then to a policy of neutralization and elimination. 36
The idea of external causation, whether a natural predisposition or a
reflection of social conditions, required a rethinking of traditional notions
of criminal liability. The system of criminal law developed from a natural
law tradition, where it was assumed that people expressed free will and
choice. These notions were challenged by biological, social or psychologi-
cal predispositions. Did criminals choose to break the law, or were they
driven by other, discoverable causes? The absence of free choice, of
course, dramatically altered the theory of deterrence.37 The idea that a
criminal act did not result from a free choice, but was due to some extrin-
sic and discoverable force, severed the causal connection necessary to jus-
tify some theories of punishment. 38
33. ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY 20 (1969). Platt also notes the influence of Herbert Spencer. See also RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1860-1915, 31-50 (1945).
34. For a series of anecdotes that illustrate the popularity of these sentiments, see
PLATT, supra note 32, at 15-45. Platt notes the infatuation of American sociologists with
the work of Herbert Spencer and Cesare Lombroso, and their "emphasis on Darwinist and
biological images of human behavior." Id. at 19. See also HOFSTADTER, supra note 32, at
5.
35. The effect of this larger vision of science affected the study of law as well, as evi-
denced by Langdell's scientific approach, and the formalist notion that the law had only to
be discovered. Cf. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
36. Criminologist Leon Radzinowicz thus justified "eradication of elements that con-
stituted a permanent and serious danger." IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 55 (1966), quoted in
PLATT, supra note 32, at 21.
37. As a method of social control, deterrence presupposes that punishment will deter
future behavior by the same individual (specific deterrence) or by other people (general
deterrence). The application of deterrence theory, however, is somewhat more
complicated.
38. The goals of punishment are generally thought of in four ways: incapacitation, re-
habilitation, retribution, and deterrence. Deterrence can be both general-the punishment
of the individual deters other individuals in society from engaging in the prohibited con-
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Ultimately, however, social Darwinism failed to capture the entire
spectrum of criminological theory in America. This failure can be attrib-
uted to three main factors: the influence of professional classes on the
development of criminology; the persistence of religious ideals of salva-
tion, particularly as applied to children; and increased attention to the
detrimental effects of an urban, industrial environment on the human
condition, again, particularly as applied to the healthy development of
children.
The professionals with the closest degree of contact with the study of
criminals gained advantage by leaning toward a treatment model. The
doctors who directed much of the research in criminology found it diffi-
cult to abandon the medical treatment paradigm. 39 Perhaps as a result of
subconscious self-promotion, doctors suggested treatments and cures,
even for those whose "illness" was the result of a hereditary condition.40
Another profession, prison guards, organized into "correctional associa-
tions" and sought to increase their status by undertaking a role as treat-
ment providers as opposed to "custodians of the pariah class." 41
Echoes of Christian thought infused a belief in the possibility for reha-
bilitation, especially for children.42 The idea that a child could be predis-
posed to a life of crime was difficult for the religiously inclined to accept,
as it precluded salvation and active deific intervention. Since it was im-
possible to imagine a world with these constraints, the deterministic hy-
pothesis was rejected, or at least modified, to include the possibility of
redemption.
As urban centers grew in size and virulence, industrialization and its
effect on family life and children was viewed as an important, if not pri-
mary, factor in developing criminal behavior. Criminology presented so-
cial science with perhaps its most difficult problem in multivariable
causation. The complexity of urban society made it impossible to isolate
duct-or specific-the punishment of the individual deters that individual from engaging
in the conduct in the future. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN; JEREMY BEN-
THAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW; LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 2000). I return to
some of these ideas in Part III. The narrow focus of this paper, however, does not permit
an expansive discussion of penal theory. Here my aim is only to note the connection be-
tween theories of punishment and basic notions of human nature, and not to delve into the
legitimacy of any particular penal theory.
39. PLATT, supra note 33, at n.29. "The self image of penal reformers as doctors rather
than guards and the domination of criminological research in the United States by physi-
cians, helped to encourage the acceptance of 'therapeutic' strategies in prisons and
reformatories." Id.
40. "Perhaps what is most significant is that physicians furnished the official rhetoric
of penal reform. Admittedly, the criminal was 'pathological' and 'diseased,' but medical
science offered the possibility of miraculous cures." PLATT, supra note 33, at 29.
41. PLATT supra note 32, at 29-31. Prison guards stood to gain status and respect if
part of their role was the rehabilitation of the criminal as opposed to acting merely as the
"custodian of the pariah class." Id. See generally LUBOVE, THE PROFESSIONAL ALTRUIST
(1965).
42. See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 32. But Platt also notes the influence of associations of




causal chains and test null hypotheses under purely scientific conditions,
but it became increasingly clear that social circumstances could not be
ignored as a cause of criminal behavior.
As the century drew to a close, theories of sociological jurisprudence
expanded. Roscoe Pound led the academic charge, advocating a more
active role for judges and courts.43 According to Pound and others,
judges should take notice of social facts and forces. The era of "mechani-
cal" application of the law had passed forever.44 Significantly, this juris-
prudential theory offered a rational explanation for separating juveniles
from adult offenders and for embracing a rehabilitative ideal.45
3. The First Juvenile Courts: Chicago, Illinois
A group of Chicagoans conspired to improve the treatment of children
in the city through the creation of a specialized juvenile court that could
supervise all aspects of juvenile delinquency and dependency. This coali-
tion included Julia Lathrop, a newly appointed commissioner for the
State Board of Charities; Lucy Flower, a "Gilded Age Patron" with
prominent Protestant charity groups (and an orphan herself); Jane Ad-
dams, founder of the Hull House, a unique, education-based refuge for
children; and Harvey Hurd, a well-known jurist and the author of the
original enabling legislation. 46 Like a perfect storm, these actors brought
together the critical forces necessary to create a new judicial institution: a
commitment to social change, political connections to the power elite,
and the promise of financial backing from charitable organizations.47
Hurd skillfully crafted the initial legislation so that the new court,
though enacted by the state legislature, would only exist in Chicago.48
On July 1, 1899, the Illinois legislature enacted the statute creating a new
court with original jurisdiction over cases involving dependent, delin-
quent and neglected children.49 With a specially trained probation staff,
the court opened with widespread support from prosecutors, the bar asso-
43. See generally, Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM.
L. REV. 605 (1908). Sociological jurisprudence recognized that judges do make law, and
that the law that judges make should reflect the social realities, and thus arguments based
on social science could be made in addition to, or in lieu of, strictly legal arguments. BEN-
JAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 112-13 (1922).
44. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 42.
45. See ALLEN, supra note 6.
46. Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra note 16, at 110-28.
47. For example, haggling in committee resulted in a limitation to the court's jurisdic-
tion once a child had been placed with a private school, protecting the financial interests of
the schools. Id.
48. The statute only applied to counties with a population in excess of 500,000, and
thus applied only to Chicago, exempting rural counties from additional expenditures asso-
ciated with establishing separate courts. ILL. JUVENILE CT. Acr (1899). Tanenhaus, Polic-
ing the Child, supra note 16 at 141. The new court thus enjoyed the legitimacy of legislative
enactment.
49. An Act for the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent
Children," 1899 Ill. Laws. See also Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra note 16, at 121-40.
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ciation, and the community at large.50 Although the court enjoyed the
support of politicians, it received no state funding, and as such, depended
on Flower and her associates in the Protestant charity world for financial
support.
Many states followed the lead of Illinois and passed legislation author-
izing specialized juvenile courts. In New York, however, the juvenile
courts were established without legislative fiat. In 1901, a judge in Buf-
falo decided of his own accord to conduct special children's sessions twice
each week.5 1 And although New York City quickly established children's
courts, legislative authority for these courts did not arrive until twenty
years later when, in 1924, the legislature established jurisdiction for a chil-
dren's court.52
4. Juvenile Court in Operation
William Tuthill headed the juvenile court during the first few years, but
it was his replacement, Julian Mack, who proved to be a visionary leader
and who greatly shaped the design and implementation of juvenile courts.
As one of the first judges in Chicago's Juvenile Court, Mack implemented
many of the characteristic features of juvenile courts. His seminal article,
The Juvenile Court, eloquently described the theory of juvenile court: if
the state's authority to intervene in the lives of children stems from the
state's sitting in place of a parent, then the state should seek to replicate
the environment that the child would enjoy in a family setting.53 The
state, in the form of the judge, accepted the role of father and counselor,
looking after the needs of the child and preventing a "downward
career."
54
By and large, the court had to develop its own procedures. For exam-
ple, Judge Mack found the court overwhelmed by a requirement that the
court hear every complaint, so he devised a system where probation of-
ficers triaged complaints by conducting quick and informal investigations
before filing a formal complaint. This greatly increased the efficiency of
the court by reducing arbitrary complaints, but it also vested tremendous
unchecked authority in probation officers. 5 5
The intentions of the framers of juvenile courts were admirable. They
sought to remove the juvenile from "[t]he apparent rigidities, technicali-
ties, and harshness... observed in both substantive and procedural crimi-
50. Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra note 16, at 145-46.
51. See ALFRED KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CHILDREN'S COURT 30 (1953).
52. Id. at 31. In 1924 the New York enacted a statute providing jurisdiction for a
children's court separate from the criminal court.
53. See Mack, supra note 16, at 114.
54. Id. at 120.
55. By "unchecked," I refer primarily to false negative errors, where the probation
officer did not file a complaint when one should have been filed. A false positive error,
where the probation officer filed a complaint that should not have been filed, would, in
theory, be caught by the court.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
nal law."' 56 The model shifted from punishment to treatment: "The child
was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated,' and the procedures, from appre-
hension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than pu-
nitive."' 57 Accordingly, judges were permitted to exercise greater
freedom in fashioning individual remedies that were consistent with the
treatment goals of the court. Further, early judges altered court
processes in order to achieve efficiency. But this increased efficiency per-
mitted a diffusion of judicial power: non-judicial officers made decisions,
such as the validity of a complaint, that were previously reserved for
judges.
5. Early Challenges to Legitimacy
Alteration of procedural process and diffusion of judicial power led to
challenges to the legitimacy of the juvenile courts. After the Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld the state's authority to intervene in the child's life
even where the child's liberty interests were compromised, the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile courts' authority was repeatedly challenged, both
in Illinois and in other jurisdictions. 58 The Ferrier case marked a transi-
tion from an era focused on individual liberty to one marked by social
progress. But arbitrary exercise of authority and deprivation of liberty
without due process were still subject to constitutional challenge.
Early challenges examined whether the statutes provided sufficient
procedural protections to satisfy due process concerns. The California
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statute that authorized removal
of any case from the criminal court to the juvenile court where the ac-
cused was under eighteen, and permitted commitment of the juvenile
where the court was "satisfied from the evidence that such commitment
ought to be made."' 59 Significantly, the California court did not distin-
guish juvenile commitment from criminal imprisonment with respect to
the deprivation of liberty. Further, the court recognized a liberty interest
of the parents in holding that the child cannot be taken from their cus-
tody without due process. 60 The court found the commitment of a four-
teen-year-old boy to the Whittier State School until the age of majority
unconstitutional as a "judgment of imprisonment" without a jury trial.61
The court also noted that the judgment was equally void as an "award of
guardianship" because the boy's parents were not parties to the action,
and there was no finding that they were unfit.62
56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
57. Id. at 15-16.
58. Id. at 17, n.15, 18. See Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without
Impairing Individual Rights, 12 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 339, 340 (1922). Cf. Paulsen,
Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167,
174 (1966).
59. Ex Parte Becknell, 119 Cal. 496, 497-98 (1897).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Thus the California Supreme Court recognized the significance of the liberty inter-
est of the parents in their right to "care, custody, society and services" of their children. Id.
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Later cases focused on the capricious exercise of power by the juvenile
courts. In the highly publicized case of Lindsay v. Lindsay, a boy was
removed from his mother during a visit to Chicago from another state.63
The state based its intervention on the allegation that the boy's mother
was an improper guardian due to her affiliation with a religious organiza-
tion and the leader of that organization. 64 The lower courts agreed with
the state and upheld the removal of the boy to state facilities.65 In a
sharp rebuke, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding
that there was no evidentiary basis to support removal.66 The Lindsay
decision was widely reported in the press and had a great impact on the
legitimacy of the juvenile court.
In later years, critics of the juvenile courts argued that the high degree
of intervention into the family was nothing more than an attempt to con-
trol and assimilate an immigrant population. In The Child Savers,
Anthony Platt questioned the benevolent intentions of the early juvenile
court reformers.67 Instead, he argued, the juvenile courts were instru-
ments of Protestant evangelism directed to controlling the morality of im-
migrants. An unprecedented degree of access into the intimate details of
family life and broad grants of judicial discretion combined to allow the
state to dictate normative social behavior, with the threat of separating
children from parents as a powerful enforcement tool.68 Moreover, the
power of the state intruded into the most fundamental of relationships in
a manner designed to coerce or restrict certain behaviors and morals
among a targeted group of people. Platt's critique of the exercise of au-
thority undermined not only the practical result of the juvenile courts, but
also their legitimacy.
6. Idealism Lost
The experience of Chicago was by no means unique. By the 1920s,
most states had developed a form of juvenile courts to resolve the diffi-
culty presented by juvenile delinquents and dependents. These attempts
led to frequent challenges to the statutes and their implementation.69
The juvenile courts in the 1930s and 1940s seemed to operate under the
radar. By the 1950s, however, researchers noted the dramatic failures of
the juvenile justice system. Mack's ideal of a "foster" home was replaced
with overcrowded houses of detention, complete with bars on the win-
dows and locked doors. Job training resembled forced labor and disci-
63. 257 Ill 328 (1913).
64. The court noted that "[t]here is no proof in the record that the Mazdaznan religion
is an immoral religion or that Hanish himself is an immoral man or engaged in immoral
practices. Nor is there any proof that in his relations with the boy or the boy's mother he
was guilty of any conduct that rendered him an unfit associate." Id. at 340.
65. Id. at 331.
66. Id.
67. See generally PLATr, supra note 32.
68. See Platt, supra note 32. See also Tanenhaus, Policing the Child, supra note 16, and
Allen, supra note 6, at 870.
69. Tanenhaus, Juvenile Courts, supra note 28, 66-69.
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pline was harsh and frequently administered. Instead of rehabilitating
and healing, juvenile courts were, in fact, punishing.
The transition from a treatment-based ideology to a punishment-based
system turned the formative ideology inside out. Children received
neither the procedural and substantive due process rights accorded to de-
fendants in criminal court, nor the benefits of a treatment protocol.70
Children caught in the system did not improve their prospects for gainful
employment. Moreover, dependent children drew the same lot as delin-
quents, for under the treatment philosophy, it mattered little whether the
child had committed an offense or not. Just as the asymptomatic should
be treated along with the symptomatic, the operative inquiry was whether
the child needed treatment, either because of his actions or his status, and
not whether he had actually committed an offense. 71 When the treatment
model turned punitive, the juvenile courts failed not only as treatment
providers, but critically, and more devastating to the judicial institution,
they also failed as courts.
Indeed, the argument can be made that the juvenile courts were never
designed as courts, but rather, as social control and welfare institutions
that took instrumental advantage of the coercive power of the judicial
system. The question, which is equally applicable to the drug courts and
other forms of problem-solving courts, is what happens when the veil is
lifted, and we discover that the institution is not behaving like a court at
all? With the juvenile courts, the answer was to mandate procedural rules
and to make these courts act more like the judicial institution they pro-
fessed to be.
7. Resurrection of Rights: The U.S. Supreme Court Cases
Until the late 1960s, the juvenile courts functioned in a land of their
own. The broad discretion deemed necessary to provide individual solu-
tions for individual children effectively shielded the courts from scrutiny
and accountability. What began as authority to deviate from the proce-
dures in criminal court in order to meet the best interests of the child
devolved into a system of inequity and arbitrariness, as the juvenile jus-
tice system appeared more and more like the criminal justice system from
which it originally sought separation. In the early 1950s, a spike in the
number of children placed in detention facilities-essentially jails for chil-
dren-magnified the problem.72 Worse still, the constitutional due pro-
cess guarantees of the criminal justice system were noticeably absent
from juvenile courts. The system was not working.
70. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (citing to Handler, The
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wisc. L.
REV. 7 (1965); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
71. Karl Menninger, Verdict Guilty, Now What, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Aug. 1959, at
60-64, reprinted as Therapy, not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 134-35
(Jeffrey Murphie, ed. 1973).
72. See Tanenhaus, Juvenile Courts, supra note 29.
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In a series of cases in the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court put a
spotlight on the failed juvenile court system. While in theory the courts
were supposed to be acting in the best interests of the child, in fact, the
courts were using their wide discretion to deprive children of liberty with-
out due process.7 3 Kent v. United States involved the prosecution of a
juvenile in adult court.7 4 The juvenile was arrested and processed
through the juvenile court system, which had none of the procedural pro-
tections granted in criminal court. Further, the decision to transfer the
case to criminal court was completely discretionary for the judge. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the juvenile, holding that pro-
cedural safeguards must be imposed to bridge the gap between the juve-
nile and adult criminal courts. In In re Gault, a juvenile was removed
from his family and mandated to a state institution without being in-
formed of the charges against him.7 5 The Court held that juveniles were
entitled to due process rights-specifically the right to notice of the
charges, 76 the right to counsel, 77 the right to confrontation and cross-ex-
amination,7 8 and the privilege against self incrimination.7 9 In In re Win-
ship, the Court held that delinquents were entitled to the same "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof required in criminal trials.80 The
Court stopped short of complete assimilation, however, and, in McKiever
v. Pennsylvania, declined to extend the right to a jury trial to delinquency
cases. 81
While the grant of some of the due process rights traditionally reserved
for criminal defendants ameliorated unchecked abuses of discretion, the
additional procedural protections connoted a shift toward the criminal-
ization of delinquency. Further, the imposition of procedural require-
ments on the discretionary decisions of juvenile judges removed the very
element that distinguished the juvenile courts from the criminal courts.
Gault and its progeny radically altered the landscape of the juvenile
courts, and probably foreclosed forever a return to a pure rehabilitative
ideal.
8. Current Trends
In the specialized courts dealing with juvenile delinquency, dependency
and other legal issues related to the family, 82 judges enjoy wide discretion
73. From an historical perspective, it makes perfect sense that the rights rhetoric that
fueled the 1870 Turner decision in the Reconstruction Era resurfaced in the Civil Rights
Era of the 1960s.
74. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
75. 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
76. Id. at 31-34.
77. Id. at 34-42.
78. Id. at 42-57.
79. Id. at 42-57.
80. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
81. 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
82. New York's Family Court has jurisdiction over most, but not all, family-related




to fashion individual remedies that generally comport with a rehabilita-
tive ideal. Courts hear not only juvenile delinquency cases, but also
abuse and neglect proceedings, status offenses, and, in many jurisdictions,
divorce, adoption and custody filings. 83 The juvenile courts depend on all
of the interested parties to supply input to the court. Parents, probation
officers, treatment providers, social workers, state attorneys, and attor-
neys for the children and parents convene in a typical juvenile court pro-
ceeding. Juvenile courts continue to struggle with the monumental task
of monitoring the well-being of the children within their jurisdictions.
News accounts of the missed case of abuse or neglect are too common,
and often the cases that begin with a child as the victim frequently pro-
gress to instances of the child as victimizer.84
The juvenile courts continue to search for creative answers. One exam-
ple of innovation can be found in New York's Family Treatment Court.85
Aimed at reuniting families ravaged by drug abuse, the court uses family
reunion as a motivational tool for assisting parents with the struggle to
overcome their addictions. The Family Treatment Court has enjoyed suc-
cess in reuniting families much more rapidly than traditional juvenile
court. 86 Like the drug courts discussed in the next section, Family Treat-
ment Court uses a system of graduated rewards and sanctions in response
to treatment progress, and like the drug courts, reports a high degree of
success.
87
Operating in the shadow of Gault, however, most juvenile courts treat
delinquency matters separately from dependency matters. Legislation
over the last twenty years has drastically increased criminal liability for
children: minimum ages for transfer to adult court have been lowered,
and the number and type of offenses that require removal to adult court
has increased, 88 and, in the ultimate rejection of the formative ideology of
juvenile courts, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the death penalty for
juveniles. 89 Thus, the legal treatment of children, at least in the area of
83. Status offenses generally involve a request to the court for assistance in controlling
the behavior of a child, but do not involve allegations of criminal behavior. In New York,
status offenders are referred to as persons in need of supervision, or PINS.
84. New Details on Failures in Child Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2003 at B1, col. 5.
85. See, e.g., Jane Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model Family
Courts, 2002 Wisc. L. REV. 331, 331 (2002).
86. Id. at 333.
87. Id. at 332-33.
88. See generally THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADO-
LESCENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan and Franklin Zimring, eds., 2000).
89. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding death penalty for 16
and 17- year-olds); cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (death penalty for
15-year-old violates "cruel and unusual" punishment). This issue has come before the Su-
preme Court again, invited by the Court's opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002) (overturning Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), by declaring that national con-
sensus against the application of the death penalty to the mentally retarded had reached a
point such that execution was barred on 8th amendment "cruel and unusual punishment"
grounds). The Missouri Supreme Court applied the Atkins rationale to a 17-year-old, over-
turning his death sentence on grounds that Atkins-type national consensus existed with
respect to juveniles, and that Atkins implicitly overruled Stanford. Ex rel. Simmons v.
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delinquency, has increasingly mirrored the treatment of adult offenders. 90
B. DRUG COURTS
Drug courts are not the only form of problem-solving court, but they
are by far the most common, and their sixteen-year history allows a longi-
tudinal analysis not yet available for other problem-solving court models.
Moreover the drug courts, and their claims of success, provided the impe-
tus for application of the model to other areas. For these reasons, the
discussion of problem-solving courts here focuses on drug courts.
1. The Legal Prehistory
Beginning in the mid-1970s, legislatures started to pass statutes that
dramatically increased the penalties for substance abuse. 91 New York's
Rockefeller Drug Laws were some of the first, and remain among the
harshest, of these new statutory structures. 92 At roughly the same time,
many states enacted legislation that limited plea bargaining to curb what
were perceived as abuses in judicial discretion that created inequity.93
Ten years later, in the mid-1980s, the federal sentencing guidelines
were enacted. 94 In an effort to restrict the discretion of individual judges,
the guidelines sought to nationalize sentences imposed for violation of
federal laws, generally by increasing the mandatory minimum sentences
and providing judges with a mechanical chart to assess mitigating and
aggravating factors to consider.95
As new criminal legislation gained popularity, the law enforcement ef-
fort directed at drug crime increased tremendously. Federal funds subsi-
dized local efforts to enforce drug laws. 96 Law enforcement budgets
ballooned, and the number of drug cases increased dramatically as well. 97
Though the budget increases may have originally been intended as tem-
porary, the additional money soon resembled a production contract:
Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, Roper v. Simmons, 124 S. Ct. 1171
(2004).
90. Not surprisingly, children who enter the juvenile justice system with dependency,
abuse or neglect issues often commit acts of delinquency.
91. See generally Cal. Penal Law, N.Y. Penal Law, Federal Controlled Substance
Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1101, et. seq.
92. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220, and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10, enacted 1973.
93. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Law, N.Y. Penal Law. Several explanations have been offered
for this trend; I mention only a couple, as the paper focuses on the aftermath of this trend,
not its causes. One explanation holds that as drug usage and abuse became much more
visible and prevalent, the legislatures passed strict drug laws in an attempt to shift social
behaviors away from the drug culture. Another theory explains that as the Warren Court
preempted criminal procedures, the legislature tried to reclaim power in the criminal arena
by increasing penalties. William H. Simon, Criminal Defenders and Community Justice:
The Drug Court Example, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1595, 1598-99 (2003).
94. See The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984), 28 U.S.C. § 991.
95. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).





funding was justified only as long as arrest numbers remained high, thus
justifying more spending.98 It is no surprise then, given the incentives,
that drug arrests continued to climb at an alarming rate, dramatically in-
creasing through the 1990s. 99
These forces created an inevitable bottleneck. Drug cases that were
once minor offenses now required intensive litigation efforts. Limits on
plea bargaining and mandatory sentences meant that judges, prosecutors
and defense attorneys could not ease the burden on the system through
negotiation. The overwhelming majority of cases in the criminal justice
system were drug related.100
2. Developing Social Science
A robust, interdisciplinary debate fueled deep concerns about the pa-
thology of drug addiction. Traditional concepts of drug use as criminal
behavior meriting punishment were challenged by a view of addiction as
a disease, supporting the notion that addicts should be treated, not pun-
ished. The question of whether to treat or punish revived an ancient the-
oretical schism between a treatment-based model and a punishment-
based system of criminal justice.
On a theoretical level, treatment and punishment appear mutually ex-
clusive. One punishes as a last resort, only when all other incentives have
failed to achieve the desired result. Treatment, on the other hand, should
be initiated at the earliest possible moment. Punishment should only be
inflicted on the guilty,101 but treatment should be applied in both the
post-symptomatic phase and for the sake of prevention. Moreover, at
least in the public health context, coerced treatment and deprivations of
liberty, such as monitored medication and quarantines, are justified by
the benefits to the individual and to society.102
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a
statute criminalizing the status of addiction. 10 3 The Court reasoned that
because addiction represents a status, and not an action, it falls outside
98. Hoffman noted that the existence of a specialized drug court provoked an increase
in the arrest and prosecution of drug cases, an effect he attributes to a lack of discretion by
police and prosecutors. Rather than arresting criminals, police were "trolling for patients."
Morris Hoffman, Comments at Symposium for Problem-solving Courts, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, New York, NY (February 28, 2002).
99. The astronomical cost of incarcerating record numbers of non-violent offenders,
however, appears to be an unconsidered consequence of increased penalties and
enforcement.
100. See Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Statistics, supra note 96.
101. Some strict utilitarians may disagree, and propose a hypothetical situation where
the utilitarian calculus provides an optimal benefit to society when one person is unjustly
punished.
102. See generally Lawrence Gostin, Compulsory Treatment for Drug-dependent Per-
sons: Justifications for a Public Health Approach to Drug Dependency, 69 MILB3ANK Q. 561
(1991). Public health models provide a justification for the coercive use of the state's
power to restrain liberty in the interests of public safety. For example, the use of quaran-
tine for contagious disease or involuntary commitment for the mentally ill are relatively
uncontroversial uses of the state's authority against an individual.
103. 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
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the ambit of areas appropriate for criminal penalty. 10 4 Several years
later, however, in Powell v. Texas, the Court upheld a statute banning
public drunkenness. 0 5 Thus, while being addicted cannot be punished,
the natural effects of addiction could be.
3. Theoretical Foundations: Therapeutic Jurisprudence
In mental health law, a theory of therapeutic jurisprudence developed
around the idea that state civil commitment hearings were less traumatic
when held in a non-adversarial context where the patient had significant
voice in the ultimate decision.10 6 As the drug courts ultimately searched
for a theoretical foundation to support what was occurring in the courts,
therapeutic jurisprudence fit the bill.
Therapeutic jurisprudence holds, in essence, that actions in the court-
room have therapeutic and non-therapeutic consequences. 107 To the ex-
tent that the court can adapt its practices to assist in the therapeutic
process of recovery, the court should do so. Importantly, the corrections
and adaptations to court practice should occur within the already estab-
lished standards of due process: a client should not lose his due process
protections by the court's inclusion of therapeutic principles. In practice,
the drug treatment courts are prone to adopt the language of treatment,
but may not, in fact, strictly adhere to the cautions of therapeutic juris-
prudence theory. Many drug courts, for example, view coercion as an
acceptable, and necessary, component of the recovery process.
In an important article, Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma, and
John T.A. Rosenthal, described the adoption of the concepts of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence by the drug treatment courts.10 8 The theory of thera-
peutic jurisprudence holds that the court itself can be an effective tool in
the treatment and recovery process. 10 9 Judges are encouraged to engage
defendants in open and frank discussions about successes and shortcom-
ings in the treatment process. 1 10 In return, judges become more human-
ized, and defendants obtain a sense of self-determinism-a feeling that
they are in control of their treatment progress. 1
While the drug treatment court community has self-identified with
therapeutic jurisprudence, other theories explain the dynamic process en-
104. Id. at 666-667.
105. 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
106. See WINICK & WEXLER, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996) [hereinafter WINICK & WEXLER].
107. Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts (Bruce
Winick & David Wexler eds.) (2003), at 18-19.
108. Fulton-Hora et al, supra note 9, at 442-49. The literature suggests a strong corre-
lation between therapeutic jurisprudence and the drug treatment courts. Significantly,
there is a marked absence of literature wherein the drug treatment courts disavow a con-
nection to therapeutic jurisprudence. See also William Schma, Judging for the New Mil-
lenium, in Winick & Wexler eds., Judging in a Therapeutic Key, supra note 106, at 87-90.





visioned by these courts. For example, similar ideas are raised in the the-
ory of restorative justice, but the United States drug treatment courts
fundamentally adhere to a theory of therapeutic jurisprudence."12 In a
detailed analysis of the drug treatment courts, Professors Dorf and Sabel
place the drug courts into the category of experimentalist institutions that
make up a new form of governance, democratic experimentalism.' 13 Ac-
cording to this account, courts provide the forum and some of the precon-
ditions necessary for a democratic process. The court gathers the
interested parties together and, at times, acts as a steerer of interests,
creating barriers to some desired outcomes in order to align the interests
of all of the parties in creating a workable and adaptable solution to the
problem. In the typical public law or environmental law case, the court
issues a preliminary injunction, or some other default event. The injunc-
tion or default event creates incentives for the parties to negotiate a mu-
tually agreed upon solution that is preferable to the option proposed by
the court. The central premise holds that a flexible, fully informed and
democratically administered standard is preferable to the imposition of a
standard by a court. The process is evolving and dynamic in that solu-
tions often prescribe monitoring and adjustment over time in order to
achieve the best result.
4. The First Drug Treatment Court: Dade County, Florida
The first drug treatment court was established in 1989 in Dade County,
Florida. Over the next fourteen years, almost 800 drug treatment courts
opened across the country.114 These courts differed from the specialized
drug courts that had been in operation since the 1950s in some jurisdic-
tions, in that previous models were either case management systems or
"last chance" diversion programs.115 The new drug treatment courts dif-
fered from previous models primarily in the degree of the devotion to the
study and understanding of drug addiction and the recovery process. In
contrast to "last chance" programs, the new courts accepted the scientific
view of recovery as a process marked by success and failure.
5. Drug Courts in Operation
Typically, the drug courts enjoyed support from all of the traditional
players in the criminal justice system. The promise of a reduced docket
112. For an explanation of restorative justice, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002).
113. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 2, at 834 n.3.
114. By 1996, 117 drug treatment courts were operational. That number grew to 275 by
1998 and to 688 by 2001. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review,
NAT'L DRUG COURT INSTITUTE REV. 1, 1 (1998) [hereinafter, Belenko I]; Steven Belenko,
Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review 2001 Update (2001) [hereinafter, Belenko II].
By 2004, 1677 drug courts were in operation or planning in the United States. DJP Drug
Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, Summary of Drug Court Activity
by State and County, May 27, 2004. American University, Justice Programs Office, School
of Public Affairs, available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/publications/drychart2k.pdf.
115. Belenko I, supra note 114, at 5.
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of trial cases attracted judges. Prosecutors, likewise, reaped the benefits
of a reduced number of cases to prepare for trial and the additional fund-
ing that accompanies a new drug court. Defense lawyers were intrigued
by the possibility of a way around mandatory jail sentences, a rationale
that obviously speaks to the interests of defendants. 116 Court administra-
tors are attracted by the claims of cost effectiveness. In many states,
high-ranking officials in the judiciary have eagerly assisted in the imple-
mentation of drug treatment courts. 117
Conceptually, the juvenile courts disengaged entirely from the criminal
courts, forming a separate institutional jurisdiction. The drug courts,
however, remained within the existing structure of the criminal justice
system. Many of the standard practices were changed or removed for the
drug treatment court to operate. Each jurisdiction created its own spe-
cific procedures and rules, so there is not a uniform drug court model.
Most drug courts, for example, are "post-adjudicative," requiring defend-
ants to enter a guilty plea at an early stage of the proceedings, thereby
"waiving" the right to be prosecuted under the old regime and "volunta-
rily" entering the new system.118 Some, however, permit a defendant to
enter the program without an admission of guilt.
Drug treatment courts differ significantly in selection criteria and eligi-
bility restrictions. Most drug treatment courts disqualify defendants ac-
cused of violent crimes, even when drug-related. 119 In many jurisdictions,
the consent of the prosecutor is required before the defendant will be
permitted to enter the drug treatment court. Some drug treatment courts
disqualify defendants who have a violent criminal history. 120
Once the defendant passes the legal qualification stage, he must con-
sent to an initial clinical evaluation by a treatment provider. The purpose
of this interview is to determine whether the defendant has substance
abuse issues and is amenable to treatment. In many jurisdictions, the
clinical evaluation also attempts to determine whether the defendant has
116. This is not to imply universal support for the drug courts. Defense attorneys and
prosecutors have been critical of the programs. See, e.g., Mae Quinn, Whose Team Am I
on Anyway: Musings of a Public Defender about Drug Treatment Court, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L.
Soc. & CHANGE 37 (2000). One public defender office has refused to staff the drug treat-
ment court (though the dispute appears to be related more to funding than a philosophical
divide). Missouri Public Defender Commission Findings and Directive Regarding Post
Plea Treatment Courts, OJP Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project,
American University, available at http://www.spa.american.edu/justice/publications. On
the whole, defendants are probably greater proponents of the drug courts than defense
attorneys.
117. Judith Kaye, Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, has been an outspo-
ken advocate of problem-solving courts.
118. Fulton-Hora et. al, supra note 9, at 521. See also OJP Clearinghouse and Techni-
cals Assistance Project, supra note 13, http://spa.american.edu/justice/documentviewer.
asp?
119. Federal grant money is conditioned upon excluding those offenders charged with
violent felonies.
120. OJP Drug Court and Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, supra note
13, http://spa.american.edu/justice/documentviewer.asp?10=379, at 33-37.
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mental health issues that might impair the treatment process. 121
Assuming the defendant passes the clinical selection criteria, the defen-
dant must enter a plea, usually to the highest offense alleged, and usually
very early in the legal process. An early plea is a critical component of
most drug court models. A rapid progression from arrest to treatment
facilitates the treatment process, as it stresses the causal connection be-
tween drug activity and the consequences of that behavior. In addition,
the early plea eases court congestion and satisfies prosecution concerns
about conviction rates and case loads.
The plea agreement includes an explanation of the terms of the treat-
ment court. Many jurisdictions use a contract between the court and the
defendant, specifying the duties and obligations of each party and the
penalties for breach. If the defendant successfully completes the treat-
ment program, the court will expunge the conviction or the defendant
will be permitted to withdraw his plea and re-plead to a lesser offense. If
the defendant fails to complete the treatment process, the original plea of
guilty is enforced, and the defendant is, in most cases, sentenced to a long
period of incarceration.
The defendant also must waive a number of rights that would otherwise
accrue to him. Federal and state constitutions guarantee a criminal de-
fendant the right to counsel, and protections against coerced self-incrimi-
nation and unreasonable searches and seizures. 122 Federal statute
provides additional protection for persons in substance abuse rehabilita-
tion programs. 123
The assistance of independent counsel is relinquished along with any
protections against self-incrimination, as the treatment process proceeds
with a collaborative, and not an adversarial, model. Under the collabora-
tive model, the prosecutor, defense attorney, judge and treatment pro-
vider are all part of the same team, working to help the defendant
complete the treatment program. This collaborative approach cannot op-
erate without full disclosures by the defendant, unimpeded by the inter-
ference of counsel. Further, in many drug treatment court appearances,
defense counsel is absent.124
The role of defense counsel shifts dramatically from one of "zealous
representation" of the client to one of collaboration with other partici-
121. The dual diagnosis of Mentally Impaired, Chemically Addicted (MICA) is so com-
mon that most treatment providers have specific MICA policies. Many do not accept
MICA patients because of the difficulties in accommodating mental fragility in treatment
modalities using confrontational or group therapy techniques.
122. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, and analogous provisions in most state constitutions.
The right to counsel extends beyond the entry of a guilty plea.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a) prohibits disclosure of the "identity, diagnosis, prognosis or
treatment of any patient [records] maintained in connection with ... any program or activ-
ity relating to substance abuse education, prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation or
research ......
124. See Elaine M. Wolf, Systemic Constraints on the Implementation of a Northeastern
Drug Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACrICE (James Nolan, ed. 2002).
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pants in the court. 125 The primary role of defense counsel in the prob-
lem-solving courts is to facilitate the treatment process, and ethical
questions arise when the wishes of the client differ from what the treat-
ment team perceives to be the best interests of the client. 12 6
In addition, the defendant must consent to any searches and drug
tests. 127 Random drug testing is the key monitoring mechanism to detect
relapse and is thus a fundamental part of the drug treatment courts. As
with the protections mentioned above, the goals of the treatment pro-
gram trump the rights that would ordinarily accrue to the defendant.
Finally, in some jurisdictions, the defendant must waive the right to
move to recuse the treatment court judge. For example, in Escambia
County, Florida, participants must sign a waiver of the right to bring a
future recusal motion based on the judge's personal knowledge or in-
volvement with the defendant's progress in treatment. 128
6. The Moment of Failure
An initial response to the relinquishment of these rights might be, "so
what?" At first glance, each exchange of rights is rationally related to a
treatment purpose and, in that respect, seems not only justified, but ideal.
The key to understanding the potential problems with the problem-solv-
ing court model, however, lies in the moment when the defendant is
deemed to fail treatment. As long as the treatment program continues,
the exchange of due process rights for a treatment opportunity does not
appear problematic. But when the moment of failure, or alleged failure,
arrives, the process abruptly reverts to an adversarial format. The proba-
tion officer, treatment provider, prosecutor or judge may want to discon-
tinue treatment and send the defendant to prison. The defendant
presumably disagrees with this option. At this moment, the "traditional"
court system has been resurrected and the due process rights and protec-
tions must be replaced. The defendant at this point should have the assis-
tance of counsel, protections against self-incrimination, and other
procedural and substantive protections. Unfortunately, he has already
waived those rights.
This moment of failure is also where the judge exercises the most dis-
cretion, and where the power is simultaneously at its greatest and most
diffuse. The decision of the court that the defendant did not complete the
treatment program is based not on a legal standard, but on a clinical stan-
dard, or perhaps on a subjective impression that the defendant is not put-
ting forth sufficient effort.
125. The Model Code defines the attorney's obligation to her client as "zealous repre-
sentation." See Quinn, supra note 116, at 39.
126. See id. (describing the dilemma).
127. But see U.S. CONST. amend. IV and analogous provisions in most state constitu-
tions, protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures.
128. Waiver of Right to Assert Specified Grounds as a Basis for Motion of Recusal,




Just as different drug treatment courts have distinct standards for ad-
mittance to the program, they also have disparate standards for failing
out of the program. Although one of the principles of the drug treatment
courts is that relapse is a part of recovery, the point at which additional
relapses result in disqualification from the program is a fuzzy and subjec-
tive line.1 29 There do not appear to be any uniform standards from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. 130 Most drug treatment courts employ a
standardized schedule of rewards and sanctions, but this system, while
appealing to those concerned with equal protection and fairness, diverges
from the treatment philosophy. The implicit rationale for a standardized
schedule is to avoid inequality. Adhering too closely to a standard, how-
ever, denies the individualized action necessary for successful treat-
ment.13' Herein lies the tension between greater discretion and
individual attention required in a treatment process and the need for uni-
formity and fairness in a punitive system.
Scholars have suggested that drug treatment courts employ democratic
experimentalist governance to ease this tension.132 Under these princi-
ples the standard becomes nonstatic, and as the court learns what types of
treatments, rewards and sanctions work, the standard changes to incorpo-
rate the new learning. By avoiding blind adherence to bureaucratic rules,
the institution is freed from stasis and permitted to evolve to a more re-
fined process.
7. Statistical Measures of Effectiveness
Numerous studies have attempted to measure the effectiveness of the
drug treatment courts. Merely defining effectiveness in this context is dif-
ficult, and uncovering a means to measure effectiveness is even more ar-
duous. Most studies look to recidivism rates as a measure of whether the
drug treatment court was effective. Obviously, if the goal of treatment is
to cure the person of the addiction, then re-arrest rates are a blunt instru-
ment to measure success. On the other hand, the cost effectiveness of the
drug treatment courts is enhanced by reductions in future cases. If a per-
son who goes through the drug treatment court is less likely to produce
future expenses related to future cases, then the drug treatment courts
seem effective. The methodological problems with the experimental de-
sign do not end here. Some studies fail to maintain consistent measures
of "success," and few provide a measure of effectiveness over a period of
time. Moreover, many studies suffer internal bias as they are self-re-
ported and linked to the continuation of grant money.
129. One treatment court judge remarked that she only failed a person out of the pro-
gram if the person was rearrested on another charge that made him ineligible to continue.
Her success rate is relatively high. Other judges, however, do not give unlimited "second
chances."
130. But see Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 2, at 837.
131. Here, I assume that treatment does not arrive sized to fit all.
132. But see Dorf & Sabel, Drug Courts, supra note 2, at 838; see OJP Drug Court
Clearing House and Technical Assistance Project, supra note 13, at 36-38.
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Several studies comparing the recidivism of defendants who had com-
pleted the treatment court with defendants who had proceeded through
the regular system demonstrate a minimal, perhaps statistically insignifi-
cant, difference between the two groups. 133 The charts below provide a
sample of the results that drug treatment courts report. Figures and re-
ports noted here were culled from Steven Belenko's review of studies.134
SAMPLE STUDIES (1998)135
(ALL STUDIES COVER A ONE-YEAR PERIOD
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED).
Rearrest Rearrest
Rate (%) Rate (%)
(Drug Court (Non-
Location Comparison Group Participants) participants)
Maricopa County, AZ Offenders randomly 33.1 43.7
assigned to probation
(36 month study)
Denver, CO Two comparison groups 53 58
from before establishment
of drug court
Baltimore, MD Sample created to resem- A: 22.6 A: 27.1
ble drug court partici- B: 26.5 B: 30.4
pants from drug court C: 18.5 C: 30.2
participants and probation




Travis County, TX Program eligible 38 41
defendants arrested
before court implemented
133. One study set the recidivism rate at 53% for drug court defendants and 58% for
other defendants, with a 5% margin of error. Another set the rates at 33% and 38%,
respectively, with a 5% margin of error. Differences in the two studies may be attributed
to the length of the time period covered by the study (at two years, the recidivism rate is
higher than at six months).
134. Belenko I, supra note 114; Belenko II, supra note 114.
135. The sample studies included here tested the re-arrest rates of all drug court
participants, whether the participant graduated or not, against a comparison group.
Belenko I, supra note 114, at 41-43. Other studies have compared re-arrest rates of drug
court graduates against a comparison group. Those studies, of course, report a greater
degree of success for the drug court program, but because of the skimming effect, the
studies were excluded here. Also, there are several alternative causal explanations for the
decrease in re-arrest rates. For example, one court (Baltimore) found that drug court
participants were much more likely to be employed than non-participants. So although the
causal connection that is reported attributes drug treatment program to employment and
re-arrest, it is also possible that employment is the central causal agent, and that




(ALL STUDIES COVER A ONE-YEAR PERIOD
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED).
Rearrest Rearrest
Location Comparison Group (participants) (Nonparticipants)
Polk County, IA A: referred to drug A: 37% A: 39% (tracked
court, but did not (tracked fro 450 days)
enter for 416 B: 75% (tracked
B: offenders in pilot days) for 655 days)
program designed B: 37%
to identify need (tracked
for drug court for 416
days)
Las Vegas, NV Random selection of 26% 16%
non-drug court cases
Tarrant County, TX Eligible offenders 13% 17%
who "opted out"
Salt Lake County, UT Clients assessed with 39% 73%
ASI but who did not
participate







Location Cost: Treatment Court Diversion Adjudication
Douglas Cty, NE 4352 808 8358
The difference in cost between treatment court and traditional
adjudication is almost entirely due to the costs of incarceration.
Likewise, the difference in cost between diversion and treatment court is
attributable to the cost of incarceration as well as an increased number of
court appearances. 138 Imposition of a jail sanction is positively correlated
to increased likelihood of re-arrest within a year according to a Portland
136. Belenko II, supra note 114, at 31-35. As mentioned above, this series of studies
does not include data that might support an alternative causal explanation. Specifically, no
study collected data on employment information. All studies tracked offenders over a one
year period unless otherwise indicated. One study in Baltimore used a random assignment
to either a drug treatment court or "treatment as usual." This provides the strongest
methodological design. It should be noted that although re-arrest rates showed a
statistically significant difference for participants and non-participants, the re-conviction
rates were 31% and 35% for participants and non-participants respectively, and were not
statistically significant. Id. at 36.
137. Id. at 42.
138. Id. at 41.
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court study.139
If, as the above studies indicate, there is no appreciable long-term
benefit to the drug court model, then the drug courts have a difficult row
to hoe in establishing legitimacy and in securing future funding. Indeed,
the costs, in terms of individual waiver of due process, and in terms of a
more generalized detrimental effect on the perception of judicial
authority, as well as fiscal expense, may be unjustifiable. 140 It remains
uncontroverted that almost any alternative is fiscally less expensive than
incarceration.
8. Initial Challenges to Legitimacy
Two cases reflect the potential challenges to legitimacy that could be
levied against the drug courts. In the first, People v. Avery, New York's
Court of Appeals held that statutes and precedent that would constrain
the operation of the drug treatment court were not applicable. 141 In Av-
ery, the defendant argued that the extended period between his plea and
the ultimate imposition of his sentence-during which he participated in
a drug treatment program-constituted a period of unconstitutional "in-
terim probation.' 42 Avery also argued that the procedure violated state
statutes limiting plea bargaining and requiring speedy sentencing. The
defendant appeared to raise valid concerns. 143 The Court of Appeals,
however, was not persuaded. The decision does not offer a particularly
reasoned approach, but in effect, allows the drug courts, and other prob-
lem-solving courts, to function.
In the second, State v. Alexander, Oklahoma's Supreme Court heard
arguments based on the dangers presented by the structure of the drug
courts. 144 The defendant argued that his termination from the drug treat-
ment program by the drug treatment court violated the state constitu-
139. Id. at 22-23 (citing J.S. Goldkamp, M.D. White & J.B. Robinson, Do Drug Courts
Work? Getting Inside the Drug Court Black Box, 31 JOURNAL OF DRUG ISSUES 1, 27-72
(2001)).
140. Some argue that drug treatment courts are a fiscally cheaper alternative. This may
be true, but three minor points should be made. First, many of the drug courts receive
initial funding from the federal government. After the court is established, the local
jurisdiction is saddled with the cost. Second, cost projections usually do not account for
the increased number of arrests and prosecutions. Third, the financial savings promised by
drug courts often factor not only the current costs of incarceration, but also the saving of
the future costs of addiction and law enforcement, in essence assuming that treatment
works. If, however, the defendant goes to jail anyway, and if there is no improvement in
recidivism rates, then it becomes more difficult to substantiate a savings.
141. 85 N.Y.2d 503, 504 (1995).
142. A few years earlier, in In re Rodney E., the Court of Appeals held that interim
probation violated the state constitution. 77 N.Y.2d 672, 673 (1991).
143. The facts of Rodney were similar to Avery, and the New York intermediate appel-
late court so held. People v. Avery, 205 A.D.2d 411 (1st Dept. 1994). The statutes do not
permit conditional sentences. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.60 (McKinney 2004). Also, in
a statute restricting plea bargaining, any indictment including a class B felony charge must
include a plea to a class D felony. N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 220.10(5)(a)(iii) (McKinney
1997 & Supp. 2004). Finally, there is no procedure for the withdrawal of a plea and re-entry
of a plea to a new offense.
144. 48 P.3d 110, 112-15 (Okla. 2000).
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tion's separation of powers provision because the sentencing judge was a
member of the treatment team. Although the court denied relief on pres-
ervation grounds, a concurring opinion essentially agreed with the defen-
dant's argument that both the Oklahoma constitution and its drug
treatment court statute require that any termination procedure be held
before a neutral judge.' 45
These two cases present challenges analogous to the early challenges
faced by the juvenile courts. At the early stages of both histories, the
appellate courts were willing to allow the new courts to operate
unimpeded.
The drug treatment courts are entering a critical phase of their devel-
opment, a point where the juvenile courts disappeared from public scru-
tiny. The early attention focused on flashy expenditures of creative
energy has passed, and the question is whether the drug courts can sus-
tain an orbital velocity. At this stage it is critical to engage in a discussion
of the institutional structure and whether that structure is sufficiently ro-
bust to sustain a challenge to legitimacy. 146
C. THE CRITICAL JUNCTURE
With a formal history spanning more than a century, the juvenile courts
present the most complete record of a problem-solving court. The history
can be divided into several periods: the founding years, the initial chal-
lenges to legitimacy, a period of lost idealism, a backlash to the institu-
tional shortcomings, and finally, another period of redevelopment and
innovation. Over the last twenty years, the trend in juvenile courts has
been toward an increased criminalization of the system, although recent
innovations suggest an effort to return to the original rehabilitative ideals.
The juvenile courts and the drug courts developed as a result of similar
forces and influences. Just as the juvenile courts faced challenges to legit-
imacy in the first decade, the drug courts should expect to face increasing
scrutiny. But, unlike the juvenile courts, the drug courts should expect to
weather this first storm. The drug courts should be wary to avoid the
period of decline that the juvenile courts experienced in the years leading
up to the Supreme Court decisions. Perhaps the deterioration of loyalty
to the founding ideals should be expected as first and second generation
leaders pass the mantle to later generations with their own theoretical
devotions. The key to the survival of the institution, then, is to entrench
the ideals within the institution in ways that prevent later distortions. En-
trenchment, of course, is more difficult given the nature of the experi-
mentalist process embodied by the drug courts and other problem-solving
courts.
Ultimately, the difficulty lies in the basic question of how to insure that
judges make good decisions. To date, no one has arrived at a successful
145. Id. at 115-17; OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. II, §§ 6, 7, 20, 21; art. VII, §1.
146. See Gostin, supra note 99.
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formula to insure careful and even-handed exercise of discretion by
judges, or legislators, for that matter, yet all agree that this is a desired
attribute in a system of justice.
III. THE IMPENDING LEGITIMACY CRISIS
A. LEGITIMACY DEFINED
What is meant by legitimacy and the impending legitimacy crisis? "Le-
gitimacy" describes the dynamic relationship between the entitlement of
one party to exercise authority and the obligation of another party to
obey. In the legal context, legitimacy describes the authority of the court
to make binding decisions, and the extent to which people adhere to the
decisions of the court or recognize the court as a proper locus for deci-
sional power. 147
Professor A. John Simmons distinguishes between two senses of legiti-
macy: the justification for the existence of the state and the justification
for particular types or systems of government within an existing state.
148
The former distinction radiates from the natural law arguments against
the anarchist, arguments that I do not pursue here. 149 Rather, when I
refer to issues of legitimacy, I mean the validity of certain institutions-
specifically the institution of the courts-as against other forms of the
same institution. More specifically, legitimacy justifies "an act, a strategy,
a practice, an arrangement or an institution typically... [by] . .. showing
it to be prudentially rational, morally acceptable or both. 1
50
Further, Professor Simmons observes two relevant types of objec-
tions-comparative objections, which rank one institution against an-
other, and non-comparative objections, which determine, on an objective
level, whether the institution is wrong or immoral. 151 Here, I focus on
comparative objections of the problem-solving courts against the baseline
of the existing "traditional" court structure. Further, the questions of le-
gitimacy explored here are distinctly sociological in nature, rather than
normative; 152 the operative questions are applied, not abstract.153
147. The legitimacy of a decision-making institution might be equated with the degree
to which the losing party will respect the decision and not seek out private revenge to
resolve the dispute. JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES at 37 (2002).
148. A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITI-
MACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 123-43 (2001).
149. An important corollary of the debate against the anarchist is the degree to which
consent, either actual or implied, is necessary to impose an obligation of obedience under a
Lockean conception of natural law. Compare Simmons, supra note 148, at 129, with Hanna
Pitkin, Obligation and Consent 1, 59 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 990, 995-97 (1965) (arguing that
Locke would find hypothetical consent relevant to a standard of legitimacy).
150. Simmons, supra note 148, at 123.
151. Id. at 123-24.
152. I do not mean to imply that the issue of normative legitimacy or morality should
not be addressed, only that I do not extend the current discussion to those areas. I rely
here on a Weberian analysis, which is inherently sociological.
153. I am concerned with what "is" and save questions of "ought" for another day.
14892004]
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So how does one determine whether one form of an institution is more
legitimate than another form of the institution? First, the different cate-
gories of legitimate authority must be identified. Max Weber precisely
delineated the "ideal types of legitimate authority," and noted that a le-
gitimate exercise of governmental authority rests on (1) rational grounds,
(2) traditional grounds, or (3) charismatic grounds. 154
There are three ideal types of legitimate authority. The validity of
the claims of legitimacy are based on:
(1) rational grounds-a belief in the legality of enacted rules and
the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue
commands (rational-legal authority);
(2) traditional grounds-an established belief in the sanctity of
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising author-
ity under them (traditional authority); and
(3) charismatic grounds-devotion to the exceptional sanctity,
heroism or character of an individual person, and of the normative
patterns of order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic
authority).155
Under the rational basis, the entitlement to exercise authority derives
from "the formal legality of their commands and is limited by the scope
of authority of that office," and the obligation to obey grows out of the
"legally established impersonal order. '156 Under the traditional basis,
the entitlement to exercise authority derives from the "traditionally sanc-
tioned position of authority," and the obligation to obey stems from "loy-
alty to the area of accustomed obligations. ' 157 Both the rational and the
traditional grounds for the exercise of authority have defined limits. Ra-
tional grounds are limited by the extent of the actual legal grant of au-
thority, whereas traditional grounds were limited by traditionally
acceptable exercises of power, or commonly held perceptions of the ex-
tent of power.' 58
The charismatic basis for the exercise of authority relies on the per-
sonal characteristics of the leader to engender the entitlement to exercise
power and the obligation to obey. Charismatic authority does not de-
pend on the actual or perceived limits on authority imposed by a legal
system, but instead relies on the extraordinary abilities (actual or per-
ceived) of the leader, "his heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as
they fall within the scope of the individual's belief in his charisma."'1
5 9
The limit of charismatic authority derives not from the perceived or ac-
tual authority of the position of power, but from the individual exercising
154. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 8-9, 336-38 (Edward Shils &
Max Rheinstein, trans., Harvard University Press 2d ed. 1925) (1954).
155. Id. at 8-9.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The perception of authority is more important to this sociological analysis than the
actual authority. A normative description would necessarily be more concerned with ac-
tual authority as well as the corresponding perception of authority.
159. WEBER, supra note 154, at 124-25.
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power. Therefore, the charismatic basis of authority is inherently unsta-
ble, lasting only as long as the life or reign of the individual leader.
The problem-solving courts appear "legitimate" because their authority
appears to be based in all three Weberian grounds for authority.160 In
most jurisdictions (though not all) a statute or some other form of posi-
tive legislation provides the problem-solving court with the rational basis
to exercise its authority. Because the problem-solving courts are per-
ceived to hold the same position of traditional courts, people believe in
the authority of the court. The traditional basis of authority provides the
strongest foundation for the exercise of power. Allegiance is owed not to
the problem-solving court per se, but to traditional respect for the institu-
tion of the judiciary. Finally, as innovative and creative institutions, these
courts tend to draw the most charismatic of judges as early leaders.
On closer examination, however, none of these grounds will be capable
of sustaining the legitimacy of these courts over the long term. The
Weberian rational basis suffers when the court acts outside of the legal
limit of its authority. The legal limit can be either a specific statutory
limit placed on the court, or the constitutional limit of authority granted
to the judicial branch of government.
B. CHALLENGES TO THE RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGITIMACY
Do problem-solving courts push the limit of either the statutory basis
or the constitutional basis of authority? The answer with respect to statu-
tory authority will, of course, depend on the specific statute. The more
pressing statutory challenge arises because the problem-solving courts
are, in most jurisdictions, created to provide a treatment exception to a
pre-existing criminal procedure and sentencing law, and the function of
the problem-solving court is to determine to whom the alternative treat-
ment system should apply and to whom the default punishment system
should apply. The problem-solving court also determines the success or
failure of the alternative treatment system, and the degree to which ele-
ments of the default punishment system should be imposed.
The challenge to the rational basis of authority increases as the differ-
ence between the two systems increases. Thus, the threat to legitimacy is
160. Several issues should be noted with respect to my reliance on a Weberian concept
of legitimacy. First, Weber adeptly provides a structural starting point for an analysis. I do
not mean to suggest that the rational-legal, traditional and charismatic are all independent
bases for legitimacy; rather, I suggest that these can contribute to the legitimacy of an
institution-particularly over the short term-and that this is precisely what has occurred
with the problem-solving courts. Second, the Weberian concept is concerned with a socio-
logical description of authority, not necessarily a normative or moral one. His grounding in
sociology, rather than political theory, forecasts a preference for the "is" over the "ought,"
and a focus on the perception of legitimacy, rather than actual legitimacy. Here, I am
concerned with the way these courts exert authority. A further discussion of whether these
courts are actually legitimate and "ought" to exert authority are interesting questions, but
beyond the scope of this paper. See DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER
(Humanities Press International, Inc. 1991); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale
University Press 1964); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
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more pronounced in jurisdictions with reduced judicial discretion and stiff
penalties for the type of offenses covered by the treatment courts. For
example, if conviction for a certain drug offense requires a long prison
sentence, then the decision to opt out of that sentence is much more sig-
nificant than the decision to opt out of a short sentence. The same holds
true for jurisdictions that limit judicial discretion. If a judge cannot exer-
cise discretion in imposing a penalty, then the granting of discretionary
power to opt out of the non-discretionary system is much more
significant.
The rational basis of authority is subject to challenge because the legis-
lature has created two statutory structures, one that includes the prob-
lem-solving courts and one that does not. Thus there is a question as to
(1) which structure should apply to a given case, and (2) who should
make that decision. 161
The constitutional challenge to the rational basis of legitimacy arises
either when the legislature places legislative decisions in the lap of the
executive or the judiciary, or when the executive and the judiciary make
those decisions. Constitutional issues arise because the problem-solving
courts create judges that act in roles traditionally associated with the ex-
ecutive or the legislature. The decision as to which of two competing
systems should apply to a given case is one best left to the legislature.
The Alexander case touched on the state constitutional issue when the
concurring opinion noted that, because the problem-solving court judge
imposed the sentence, the defendant was deprived of his constitutional
right to a neutral judge. 162 The judge had assumed a role much more like
that of an executive or administrator, and as such, should not have been
making a "judicial" decision. Some jurisdictions short-circuit the proce-
dure suggested by the concurrence in Alexander. The drug treatment
court in Escambia County, Florida, requires that participants waive the
right to move to recuse the treatment court judge in a proceeding to ter-
minate the participant from the drug treatment court. 163
161. Here, I assume that the legislature has the inherent authority to enact a treatment-
based system or a punishment-based system, or some combination of the two systems.
162. Some jurisdictions short-circuit the procedure suggested by the concurrence in Al-
exander. See State v. Alexander, 48 P.3d 110, 115-16 (Okla. 2000); supra notes 141-42 and
accompanying text.
163. Specifically, defendant is required to "waive ... his right to assert as a basis for a
motion to recuse the sitting circuit judge on the basis of: 1. That judge's personal involve-
ment with the defendant during the court [sic] of his treatment in the Escambia County
Drug Court. 2. That judge's knowledge, both personal and otherwise, of defendant's com-
pliance or non-compliance with the requirements of the Escambia County Drug Court. 3.
That judge's decision to eject the defendant from the Escambia County Drug Court Pro-
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C. CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL BASIS OF LEGITIMACY
The limit of authority can also be measured with respect to the general
perceptions of what courts should do, and erosion to the rational basis of
authority spills over to the traditional basis. For example, a court that
"crosses the line" and engages in the legislative function of creating law
or the executive function of enforcing the law is subject to challenges to
the rational basis of authority. Over time, a court subjected to repeated
challenges to legitimacy under the rational basis loses the entitlement to
exercise authority under the traditional basis. The traditional basis of au-
thority corresponds to the perception of authority, while the rational ba-
sis corresponds to actual authority. For our purposes, however, it does
not matter whether the authority is actual (rational) or perceived (tradi-
tional). It is only important to recognize that either basis can provide
legitimacy, and that the rational and the traditional are related such that a
decrease in the rational basis of authority, over time, produces a decrease
in the traditional basis of authority.
D. CHALLENGES TO THE CHARISMATIC BASIS OF AUTHORITY
Once the first generation of charismatic judges moves on, the charis-
matic basis for the exercise of authority disappears. With the juvenile
courts, a figure like Julian Mack could not be replaced. Likewise, it is
doubtful that a line of Stanley Goldsteins and Peggy Fulton-Horas stand
waiting to take the reigns of leadership in the drug courts. 164 The prob-
lem-solving courts depend on the discretion of extraordinary judges to
steady a course through clear channels of effective treatment and fair
punishment. The inability to reliably produce a succession of extraordi-
nary judges will result in decreased efficiency, and the problem-solving
courts will lose both the capacity to follow the original vision, and the
rationale to deviate from the original system.
E. ASSESSING LEGITIMACY
The question, then, is whether the problem-solving courts possess a ra-
tional or traditional basis for legitimacy. What qualities are essential to
the rational basis of a court? What establishes "the belief in the legality
of the enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under
such rules to issue commands"? 165 What characteristics relate to the
traditional basis for the authority of a court? What defines "the estab-
lished belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of
those exercising authority"? 166
Jerome Bruner describes three essential elements of legitimate deci-
sion-making bodies as ritualism, fairness and neutrality. 167 Ritualism re-
164. Stanley Goldstein was the first judge in the Dade County, Florida treatment court.
Peggy Fulton-Hora presided over the drug court in Alameda County, California.
165. WEBER, supra note 151.
166. Id.
167. BRUNER, supra note 144, Ch. 2.
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fers to the broad idea of consistency or unity 168-a common and expected
manner of resolving issues that is known and expected by the community.
Rituals develop in specific communities. In our culture the black robes of
judges and the formal atmosphere of courtrooms illustrate the ritualism
surrounding the role of judges as decision-makers. 169 The decision maker
must be perceived as fair.170 Fairness refers to an evaluation of whether
the process and the decision promote principles of justice and equality.
Courts usually accomplish this by adhering to a system of procedural jus-
tice. For example, under the common law tradition, courts rely on prece-
dent to interpret laws consistently. An institution that provides reasons
for a given outcome promotes fairness and neutrality, especially where
the reasoning is subject to appellate review. To the extent that reasons
are consistently provided, the element of ritual advances. Fairness is re-
lated to the element of neutrality. By neutral I mean that the decision-
maker is disinterested in the outcome and maintains no preference for
one outcome or party over the other.
In order to compare the degree of legitimacy of problem-solving
courts, I make several assumptions to establish a baseline or point of ref-
erence. I assume that the traditional courts are legitimate, or at least, that
the traditional courts enjoy a certain degree of legitimacy, which is de-
fined as perceived or actual authority engendering an obligation to
obey.171 For present purposes, I am willing to leave alone the issue of
whether the degree of obligation to obey rises to the level of moral legiti-
macy. 172 Here I am only trying to show the potential that problem-solv-
ing courts present for a decline in the existing level of legitimacy,
whatever that level might be.
168. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (Yale University Press
1986).
169. BRUNER, supra, note 144. Further, under a Neo-Realist theory of jurisprudence,
the ritual and tradition associated with the judicial office affect the decisions by infusing a
sense of restraint and commitment to the duty to follow the "law."
170. Fair could also refer to decisions that are thought to be morally correct. But a
morally correct decision reached through improper procedure may present a more imme-
diate threat to the legitimacy of the institution than a morally incorrect decision reached
through adherence to proper procedure. Ultimately, the institution gains legitimacy if its
decisions are later thought to be morally correct. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
171. My purpose here is not to turn a blind eye to substantial questions regarding the
function of our courts, but rather to provide a manageable limit to this discussion. Issues
regarding the legitimacy of judicial review are reserved for another time and place. Profes-
sor Mark Tushnet noted the degree to which people feel bound by the decisions of the
courts, even when they disagreed on a primary level with the decision. Specifically, Profes-
sor Tushnet describes President Reagan's underestimation of the degree to which the
American people feel bound by the decisions of the courts. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 25 (Princeton University Press 1999).
172. For example, a Razian analysis of the drug treatment courts might find legitimate
authority in the court's edict to the defendant to stop abusing drugs because that is some-
thing that the defendant should do independent of the court's command. See JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 26-35, 38-69 (1986).
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"Traditional" courts derive legitimacy from Weber's rational and tradi-
tional foundations, and often from the charismatic foundation as well.
The traditional and the rational are related. Because courts emerged
from a democratic process and because they act in accordance with the
Bruner principles of fairness, neutrality and ritualism, they exert rational
authority and command an obligation to obey. The continued adherence
to Brunerian principles of fairness and neutrality develop a correspon-
dence between the rational authority and the rituals associated with this
institution. 173 Over time, the institution and its rituals become synony-
mous with rational authority. Eventually, the rational and the traditional
form a symbiotic relationship, with each adding to the legitimacy of the
other. Notice, however, that the Weberian traditional foundation of au-
thority is only so strong as the belief that the court is acting in accordance
with the rituals that are expected of a court (black robes, formal "bench,"
austere environment, etc.). 174 Rational authority, then, depends on
courts acting as courts-under the powers entrusted or bestowed on
them. Traditional authority trails rational authority, but gains strength
over time.
The charismatic foundation of authority, though, is inherently unstable
as it relies on the individual leader. Individual judges may add to the
legitimacy through spectacular performance, and even marginally charis-
matic judges strengthen the legitimacy of the courts. Yet the charismatic
leader can reinforce authority when the traditional or rational founda-
tions are stretched.
In sum, courts depend on an established track record of the Brunerian
qualities of neutrality, procedural justice, fairness, and ritualism for legiti-
macy. In addition, charismatic leaders can provide a temporary infusion
of authority to an institution, but only so long as the leader retains the
support of the community. Thus, threats to legitimacy occur when one or
several of these fundamental Brunerian elements deteriorates to a degree
that the outcomes of the decision maker are not respected by the
community.
1. Fairness
The problem-solving courts filled the vacuum created by existing sys-
temic dysfunction. If there was no "problem," there would be no need
for the problem-solving courts. Just as the juvenile courts formed in re-
sponse to perceived injustice in the way children were treated,1 75 drug
treatment courts formed as an alternative to the bottleneck created by
huge increases in the number of drug cases and unconscionably long
173. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
175. Recall Anthony Platt's argument that the juvenile court movement was fueled by
desire to monitor and control morals of the new immigrant population. See generally
PLA-rr, supra note 33.
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prison sentences required by new sentencing structures. 176 Other forms
of problem-solving courts are responsive to specific social problems that
intersect with the criminal justice system.
On one level, the problem-solving courts might be viewed as fair be-
cause they are comparatively more lenient or more proportional than the
alternative they replace. So one might argue that imposing a treatment
program, even coercively, on those charged with drug offenses is more
fair than imposing a long prison sentence. But this perception is based on
an implicit adoption of the punishment regime where fairness, at least
regarding criminal sentencing, is judged according to proportionality. A
"punishment" of mandatory drug treatment appears proportional, or
"fair," for the offense of drug possession or use. Likewise, a punishment
of mandatory imprisonment of fifteen years to life for a "first-time" drug
possession offense seems unfair because it seems disproportionate. 177
In a treatment regime, however, the same standards do not apply.
Treatment is judged only by efficacy. For example, a treatment is not
judged by whether it is fair, or deserved, or proportional. When a child is
immunized, there is no discussion about whether she deserves the pain
from the needle's prick. The inquiry is only whether the vaccine is effec-
tive in preventing the disease. Ideas of liability, fault, guilt and fairness
are irrelevant in a treatment regime. Accordingly, the imposition of the
same fifteen to life term perceived as unfairly disproportionate would be
fitting if it were deemed part of a "treatment" and not a punitive
"sentence. "178
This line of argument leads down a thorny trail. In the drug courts, the
threat of punishment is used to coerce treatment. The overall goal of the
drug courts, the juvenile courts, and other problem-solving courts is the
rehabilitation of the offender. 179 But if treatment does not work, then
176. Again, disagreement may exist over whether an element of religious morality orig-
inally motivated and continues to drive the drug court movement. It also seems arguable
that, like the juvenile courts, the drug treatment courts are an attempt to extensively in-
trude into the private lives of immigrant and minority populations.
177. In New York, a first time offender convicted of criminal possession of four ounces
of a controlled substance faces a minimum sentence of fifteen years to life and a maximum
sentence of twenty-five years to life. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(ii), 220.18 (McKinney
1999 & Supp. 2004). Comparatively, the sentence for intentionally killing another person
ranges from twenty years to life up to twenty-five years to life. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 70.00(2)(i), 125.25 (McKinney 2004).
178. A Kantian theory of justice views punishment as necessary for recognition of the
power and value of the free will of the actor. But Kant's theory assumed criminal acts of
free will and may not apply in a world populated with diverse theories of the causes of
criminal behavior, where free will is but one possible explanation. Note that Kantian the-
ory explains the distinction between Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (sta-
tus as an addict not punishable) and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968) (public
drunkenness punishable).
179. The rehabilitative ideal emerged with the application of scientific (and medical)
principles to the field of criminology. Scientific study increased the use of efficacy as a
measure of crime policy. The exploration of natural and environmental causes of criminal
behavior supported policies directed at curing the criminal. As treatment became more
important, fairness and equity suffered. As the rehabilitative ideal fell out of favor, the
courts became more uniform and equal-more fair in administering punishment. But the
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punishment ensues. 180 The two theories have grown together, and are
almost inseparable. Treatment measures are used to determine effective-
ness of punishment. 181 And if treatment does not work, a punishment
ensues. Because the drug courts and other problem-solving courts oper-
ate primarily on the treatment model, they are susceptible to criticism as
unfair.
2. Deterioration of Adversarial Process
The problem-solving courts will not work in the criminal context with-
out a substantial departure from the adversarial system. 182 Problem-solv-
ing courts propose a collaborative endeavor, quite apart from the
traditional adversarial model, where all interested parties work toward a
common goal.183 The court itself becomes a therapeutic instrument, as-
suming an active role on the treatment team. 84 The infusion of a ther-
apy-based regime requires that defense attorneys surrender the
protective barrier they provide for their clients; the court cannot operate
without unfiltered communication between defendants and the court. In-
deed, a therapeutic model of criminal justice faces insurmountable barri-
ers in the form of the fourth, fifth, sixth and fourteenth (and possibly the
eighth) amendments. 185
Although the model of the treatment courts operates on the assump-
tion of a collaborative process, there are moments that cannot be con-
verted from adversarial to collaborative. For instance, in those cases
where a severe sanction is proposed by the court, the defendant may disa-
gree with the severity or rationale for the penalty. Likewise, the decision
to terminate a defendant from the treatment program can only be consid-
ered adversarial, since the defendant will not ordinarily agree with or
punishment system was inappropriate where the defendant did not act from choice but as
the result of either a disease or an affliction. Drug courts and other problem-solving courts
fill that void.
180. Often the punishment after a failed attempt at treatment far exceeds the punish-
ment if treatment was not attempted. See Morris Hoffman, The Denver Drug Court and Its
Unintended Consequences, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACnCE 82-83 (James
D. Nolan, ed. 2002)
181. For example, crime rates and rates of recidivism (and even deterrence) are used to
measure the effectiveness of types of punishment.
182. The criminal justice system differs significantly from other public law institutions
in that the parties are the state against an individual. So while a collaborative, forward-
looking and adaptable model of the judiciary-the Chayesian model of public law litiga-
tion-has met with success in other arenas, such as environmental law and prison reform,
the nature of the criminal proceeding raises additional concerns.
183. Fulton-Hora et al., supra note 9, at 476.
184. In this regard, the problem-solving courts differ significantly from the diversion
programs of the past. In diversion programs, the treatment occurs exclusively with the
clinical providers and counselors, and the courts maintain a traditional role of neutral over-
seer of the progress. In problem-solving courts, the court actually engages in the treatment
and becomes one of the providers. Id.
185. U.S. CONST. amends. IV (random drug testing), V (self-incrimination), VI (coun-
sel), VIII (unusual punishment), XIV (equal protection). The drug courts also require
waivers of the defendant's rights under federal statutes that protect the defendant's privacy
in drug treatment programs.
2004] 1497
SMU LAW REVIEW
freely accept the imposition of the long jail sentence that lies at the end of
the termination process.
Counsel serves a number of functions in the traditional judicial model.
Initially, the decision to initiate an action normally rests with counsel;
later, the issues are narrowed and facts and arguments are developed to
support a view of the case that supports the client. 186 The attorney also
insures that the decision-maker follows just procedures. 187 By taking
these functions out of the hands of the court, the attorney promotes the
neutrality of the judge. The problem-solving courts, however, remove the
attorney from the process. As the replacement for the attorney, the
problem-solving court judge is not neutral.
3. Coercion
Proponents of the problem-solving courts maintain that coercion is
necessary to motivate the success of treatments. 188 But when the state's
coercion takes the form of denial of liberty, it is particularly disconcert-
ing, and if left unchecked, leaves open the possibility for arbitrariness and
abuse.189
In the criminal justice system, the usual method of protecting an inter-
est is to associate a right with the interest.1 90 The interest is not inviolate,
but procedural "hoops" are created to insure that the interest is not sur-
rendered merely as a result of the overbearing power of the state. Rights
can be waived, and in almost every case, rights are waived. Very few
defendants, for instance, exercise the right to a jury trial. At times the
procedures used to protect a right may mature into a right. For example
the warnings originally used to guard the right to counsel evolved into an
entitlement.19 1 The process of waiver, therefore, is guarded by rigid ad-
herence to procedures to guarantee that the waiver is knowing, voluntary
and intelligent.1 92 Indeed, the over-assertion of the power of the state is
the very evil that is sought to be avoided by the granting of procedural
rights that then require waiver.' 93
In contrast to traditional courts, the problem-solving courts are not
particularly concerned with the voluntariness of the defendant's waiver of
his rights. In fact, the model depends on the coercive power of the court
186. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, supra note 1, at 382-85.
187. Id.
188. Fulton-Hora, et al., supra note 9, at 475-76.
189. Dorf, Indeterminacy, supra note 15, at 24.
190. Of course, this is not meant to imply that this only occurs in the criminal justice
context.
191. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Dickerson v. Florida, 530
U.S. 428 (2000).
192. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (waiver of significant constitutional
rights must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent).
193. For example, the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination are pro-
tected by the procedures suggested in the Miranda opinion. The interest to be protected is
the overbearing power of the state in interrogating suspects. But the right is not absolute,
and, in fact, Miranda merely requires that a suspect waive the right to counsel or to silence.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
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to initiate the treatment. Rather than a check on the power of the state,
there is an affirmative use of the state's power. The power is used against
the most feeble of possible parties, in a manner designed to separate the
individual from the areas protected by "rights.' 94
The critical moments in the process are entry to the problem-solving
court and exit from it. Against the threat of a long jail sentence, the deci-
sion to enter a treatment court is subject to criticism as coercive. In the
criminal context, however, the nature of plea-bargaining is inherently co-
ercive, and because of administrative concerns, courts maintain a lesser
degree of concern with the nature of the agreements made by criminal
defendants.
But even if entry to the treatment courts is treated in the same manner
as a plea bargain, the exit cannot be dismissed so easily. In contrast to
most plea bargains, the defendant is subject to a subjective standard-
whether he has successfully completed the program-in order to receive
the benefit of the bargain. 195 And, while counsel will ordinarily be pre-
sent to assist the defendant at the entry phase, counsel might not be pre-
sent at the exit stage. Further, the interim measures used to "coerce"
compliance with the treatment program are clearly punitive, but do not
seem to have any relevance to the treatment program. Defendants are
often sent to jail for brief periods of time, but there is no treatment bene-
fit to incarceration. 196 When the coercion is not related to an effective
treatment goal, then it borders on cruel punishment. In sum, there is no
proven need for the coercive aspects of the treatment courts, and the con-
tinued adoption of these measures decreases the legitimacy of the author-
ity exercised by the problem-solving courts.
4. Neutrality
The legitimacy of a traditional court rests on the perception, whether
real or not, that the court is neutral and disinterested in the outcome.
The problem-solving courts depend on the moral legitimacy of the tradi-
tional courts for the authority to coerce individual treatments. The prob-
lem-solving courts, however, are not neutral. Rather than creating a
space between the litigants and the court, as in the traditional courts,
problem-solving courts seek a complete immersion into the case. As a
part of the treatment team, the court is decidedly not disinterested or
neutral.
194. In many cases, the defendant's decision-making capacity is further decreased by
addiction or illness.
195. There are other contexts where the defendant is entitled to performance only if he
meets a subjective criteria, such as in a cooperation agreement where the extent to which
the defendant provides material and complete assistance to the prosecution is determined
by the prosecution alone. These agreements, however, occur within the context of the
adversarial system. Defense counsel is available to argue that the defendant complied with
the agreement. As noted above, the treatment courts operate outside of the adversarial
context.
196. See Belenko I, supra note 114, at 14-16 (noting no change in treatment success
based on interim jail sentences).
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Judges in problem-solving courts are actively involved in the issue se-
lection and fact determination, processes undertaken by the attorney-ad-
vocates in traditional courts. The separation of these functions critically
affects the neutrality of the court. When the judge replaces the attorney
as the party responsible for shaping the proceedings, the court must think
up the best possible arguments for each side. In the process, the court
becomes involved in the process in a way that does not occur when the
court allows counsel to present the issues and the arguments. 197 As Pro-
fessor Fuller explained:
[T]he integrity of adjudication is impaired if the arbiter not only initi-
ates the proceedings but also, in advance of the public hearing, forms
the theories about what happened and conducts his own factual in-
quiries. In such a case the arbiter cannot bring to the public hearing
an uncommitted mind; the effectiveness of participation through
proofs and reasoned arguments is accordingly reduced. 198
One of the precepts of problem-solving courts is that the judge should
be an active participant. Indeed, the courts depend on the authority of
the judge to promote the treatment progress. The judge cannot be said to
be disinterested in an outcome: clearly, the court, as part of the treatment
team, has a stake in the success of the treatment process.
These concerns are not merely theoretical. In the juvenile courts, the
lack of neutrality was central to early challenges in the Lindsay case.199
In the drug courts, the issue has reared its head as well. In the Alexander
case, a concurring opinion notes, albeit in dicta, that the treatment judge,
as an interested party, should not adjudicate the issue of termination
from the treatment program. 200
As this lack of neutrality becomes transparent, the result will be a loss
of legitimacy for the problem-solving courts, and for traditional courts as
well. The perception that all courts act neutrally, and without an interest
for any particular outcome, is crucial to the acceptance of the decision of
the court by all parties. Once that perception deteriorates, through expe-
rience with the problem-solving courts, the label of illegitimacy will not
be limited to the problem-solving courts, but could spill over to tradi-
tional courts as well.
5. Legislative Mandate
In some states, New York, for instance, the problem-solving courts are
the creation of judges.20 1 There is no enabling legislation or mandate: the
197. Fuller, supra note 1, at 385-86.
198. Id. at 386.
199. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 332 (1913).
200. 48 P.3d at 115.
201. In 1995 the New York legislature enacted a statute that provided for a treatment
alternative for certain felony offenders. In New York Criminal Procedure Law, section
410.91 permits a judge to impose a "sentence of parole supervision" where the offender
was convicted on certain drug related class D and class E felonies. The effect of the sen-
tence is to suspend the mandatory prison term in lieu of a 100 day intensive treatment
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courts simply open shop.202 Even where enabling legislation does exist,
the problem-solving courts blur the distinction between rule making and
rule enforcing, and act in both capacities.
20 3
The lack of a legislative mandate diminishes the authority of the court
in two ways. First, the action of the legislature provides an element of
democratic legitimacy to the functions of the court. The legislature is
more accountable to the people as legislators must regularly face re-elec-
tion. Judges, on the other hand, are usually appointed, and so lack a di-
rect connection to the consent of the people. Even in states where judges
are elected officials, the term of office is usually much longer for a judge
than the term for a legislator, so the degree of accountability is
lessened.2°4
Second, the lack of legislation means that the court becomes responsi-
ble for both the enactment and the enforcement of the governing rules
and procedures. The desire to avoid vesting power to enact and enforce
law in the same branch drove the organization of the federal Constitu-
tion.20 5 The three branches of government separate law-making and law-
enforcing power between the legislative and executive branches. The
courts, through judicial review and judicial supremacy, act as a check on
the other branches. But what branch can check the assertion of power by
the court?
An examination of the issue of whether the judiciary should reign su-
preme, and if so, by what means, might prove fruitless given the extensive
jurisprudential and constitutional theory literature on this topic. 20 6
Whether in favor or opposed to judicial supremacy, few scholars have
approached the topic with the idea that the court itself would create insti-
tutions that become sources of positive law. The problem-solving courts,
at least those without legislative endorsement, represent an astounding
leap in power. Rather than reviewing a statute of the legislature or an
interpretation by the executive, the judiciary has carved out the authority
to act outside of the proscribed limitations of the law. And because the
judiciary reigns supreme, the ultimate review of the authority will occur
within the judiciary itself.
program at the Department of Corrections, followed by an "intensive program of parole
supervision that will address the parolee's substance abuse history and which shall include
periodic urinalysis testing." N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 410.91(6) (McKinney 2004). This sen-
tence may only be imposed where the sentencing court finds the defendant has a substance
abuse issue that could be addressed by the treatment program. Id. at 410.91(3).
202. The New York Criminal Procedure Law was amended to permit certain judges at
arraignment to adjourn cases to a "drug court," but there is no statute that governs the
structure of the court. Cf. Oklahoma and California.
203. Professor Lon Fuller describes the problem of making and interpreting law as one
of the eight criteria of a failed legal system. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
(1963).
204. In New York, for instance, state representatives hold office for two years, while
elected judges of the supreme court hold office for fourteen years.
205. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
206. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); JER-
EMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (Clarendon Press 1999).
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Recall the Avery case. 20 7 The drug treatment court was not the crea-
tion of the legislature, but of the court itself. The defendant appealed his
termination from the program and the imposition of a prison sentence
over a year after entry of his plea. The procedural statutes prohibited
such a deferral of the imposition of sentence, and the prior decisions of
the court had interpreted the statute to prohibit just the sort of interim
probation that define the drug court treatment protocol.20 8 With a decla-
ration that the drug treatment courts did not involve interim probation,
the defendant's conviction was upheld and the future of the drug courts
preserved. 209
Our constitutional system of checks and balances is unable to function
where there is no avenue for review by another branch. Here, the execu-
tive and legislative branches are unable to check the moves of the judici-
ary, since under our system the judiciary conducts the ultimate review.
The legislature could codify a format for the drug treatment courts. A
legislative endorsement would put the checks and balances back into or-
der, would provide legitimacy through democratic accountability, and
would provide the procedural rigor necessary to engender legitimacy.
F. COUNTER-ARGUMENT: EFFICACY
The counter argument to the legitimacy concerns mentioned above is
that the problem-solving courts find legitimacy because they are more
"effective" than the institutions they replaced. Even if the structures that
are ordinarily associated with courts are altered, the resulting institution
is still entitled to exercise authority because it is either economically effi-
cient or otherwise effective.
Any claim of effectiveness or efficiency depends on a comparative
analysis. Drug treatment courts are usually compared to the institutions
they replace, frequently according to economic costs. The problem with
this argument is twofold. First, the method of measurement is wrong.
While economic efficiency is a worthwhile attribute in a court system, it
should only be considered as ancillary to the primary objective of provid-
ing a fair and neutral method of resolving disputes. If the court is beauti-
ful or efficient, in addition to resolving disputes, then so much the better.
But efficiency cannot be the sole measure of success of the court system.
Second, the claims of efficacy are, at best, marginal and fail to include
the future cost to the courts of a reduction in legitimacy (or the risk of a
loss of legitimacy). 210 As mentioned earlier, the courts measure their suc-
cess in terms of recidivism rates. If the goal of the drug treatment court is
to cure substance abuse, then recidivism is a poor measurement tool. If,
however, the goal of the drug treatment courts is merely to reduce recidi-
vism, and therefore reduce future costs, then recidivism rates are an ap-
207. People v. Avery, 85 N.Y.2d 503 (1995).
208. See In re Rodney E., 77 N.Y.2d 673 (1991); see also Avery, 85 N.Y.2d at 506-08.
209. Rodney E., 77 N.Y.2d at 674; Avery, 85 N.Y.2d at 506-08.
210. Here, efficiency is a poor substitute for effectiveness.
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propriate measure of success. It is entirely possible, for instance, that the
drug treatment courts are economically efficient, but that drug treatment
does not work. The changes in recidivism rates as reported in the data are
statistically significant, but only by the slightest margin. The end result of
changing to a barely-more-effective problem-solving court system is that
the marginal cost of the change increases dramatically. Clearly, if there is
a dramatic decrease in legitimacy and only a slight increase in efficacy,
then each unit of efficacy costs more in the currency of legitimacy than in
a comparably more effective system. Likewise, if the marginal gains in
efficacy can be maintained, but the decrease in legitimacy can be less-
ened, then costs decrease.
Finally, any discussion of economic efficiency must include the fairly
obvious observation that incarceration is the most costly alternative.
211
In fact, the claimed efficiencies, or cost savings, are based largely on sav-
ing the costs of incarceration. 21 2
G. CONCLUSION
In sum, any system of dispute resolution must have legitimacy: an enti-
tlement to exercise authority and an obligation to obey. The problem-
solving courts present issues related to each of the three bases of legiti-
macy. Because of their experimental, avant-garde nature, the problem-
solving courts tend to draw natural leaders from among the judiciary.
Thus, innovators like Stanley Goldstein and Peggy Fulton Hora are ex-
actly the type of charismatic individuals who would be expected to take
the baton and run with it.213 But once their terms end, the courts may
face a crisis because the legitimacy of the institution was based only on
the charisma of the first generation of leaders. 214
As a new institution, the problem-solving courts cannot rely on an in-
dependent "traditional basis" of authority. The problem-solving courts
rely on the existing cache of legitimacy held by the "courts." The whole
idea of therapeutic jurisprudence is based on the concept of directing the
authority of the court in a therapeutic manner. This "borrowed legiti-
macy" is not based on the problem-solving court's current action. In-
stead, the problem-solving court has authority because it is a "court." As
211. A frank discussion about incarceration has had a fracturing effect on the consensus
necessary to promote the drug treatment court model. Judges and prosecutors often reject
the model if the threat of incarceration is removed, as evidenced by the response to Cali-
fornia's recently enacted Proposition 36. Prop. 36 required drug treatment for all first time
offenders without the threat of jail. Some proponents of the drug treatment court opposed
the Prop. 36 procedure because of the lack of a significant "stick" to coerce treatment
success. Others disagreed with the measure because of the projected strain on treatment
resources.
212. See Belenko I & II, supra notes 134 to 139, and accompanying text.
213. Judge Stanley Goldstein & Judge Peggy Fulton Hora were leaders in implementing
drug treatment courts in Miami, Florida, and Oakland, California, respectively. The suc-
cess reported by those programs can be attributed to the remarkable leadership abilities of
these innovators.
214. There is not yet a system of choosing only good discretion wielders as judges-or
as legislators or executives, for that matter-nor is there much hope for such magic.
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soon as the smoke clears, however, the problem-solving courts will have
to justify their exercise of authority without reference to the traditional
courts. This will be a difficult, perhaps impossible, task.
The problem-solving courts change the basic nature of the courts. They
demonstrate none of the characteristics that would ordinarily add to the
rational basis of legitimacy. They are not fair. They are not neutral. In
some instances, they are not legislatively enacted. Without a rational ba-
sis to exercise authority, the tradition of following the authority of the
court, merely because it is a court, will deteriorate. The problem-solving
courts are headed for a crisis of legitimacy.
Most importantly, there must be a recognition that legitimacy is neces-
sary to the functioning of the court. Because the court succeeds only if
the participants complete a process that has, at its core, a self-realized
goal, the court cannot hope for success by forcing or coercing people to
complete the treatment program. Rather, the success of the court de-
pends on the legitimacy of the institution in coercing people to start a
process that they will want to finish. Thus, the legitimacy of the court
matters because it is inextricably related to the success of the court.
IV. A CASE STUDY: JUVENILE INTERVENTION COURT AT
THE HARLEM COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER
A. INTRODUCTION
Only a few years ago, the dilapidated Harlem Courthouse lay in an idle
state of disrepair. Today, the Harlem Community Justice Center occupies
the beautifully renovated courthouse. Inside, a charismatic judge and a
dedicated staff administer dynamic new programs designed to serve the
needs of the community. One of those programs, the Juvenile Interven-
tion Court (JIC), combines aspects of juvenile courts, drug courts and
community courts to provide treatment, services and activities for local
at-risk children. In theory, the JIC presents an ideal combination of
problem solving institutions devoted to the rehabilitative ideal. In prac-
tice, however, the JIC demonstrates the difficulties of infusing a treat-
ment ideal into a punitive institution.
In February, 2003, the JIC recognized, rather anticlimactically, its first
graduation. The "offense" that brought the child into JIC was such a
mild act of delinquency that if the case had been processed at the central
Family Court downtown, it would have been adjourned in contemplation
of dismissal. 215 After almost a year of counseling and programming, in-
215. A wide range of dispositions was possible, from an Adjournment in Contempla-
tion of Dismissal ("ACD") to multi-year restrictive placements. An ACD is the least oner-
ous disposition available in cases of delinquency, and involves an adjournment for up to six
months with a view to ultimate dismissal of the petition. N.Y. JUD. CT. Ac-rs §315.3 (Mc-
Kinney 1999 & Supp). The court has the authority to grant an ACD before a fact finding
or admission, and does not require the consent of Corp. Counsel. N.Y. JUD. CT. AcTs
§§ 315.3(1); 315.3(3). In exchange for an ACD, the court may require that the child fulfill
certain terms and conditions, including supervision by Probation. N.Y. JUD. CT. Acas
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formation gathering and monitoring, the youth walked out of JIC still in
need of services and treatment. A treatment provider could present a
cogent argument that the JIC should have kept monitoring and providing
services to the youth. But from a traditional judicial perspective, keeping
the youth under the arm of the court any longer would be a grossly dis-
proportionate "punishment" for the "crime. '21 6
This type of dilemma is endemic to JIC and to other new problem-
solving courts that attempt to infuse principles of treatment into a institu-
tional environment colored by a culture of punishment. Is the court's
ultimate function to insure that the treatment process succeeds, or does
the court owe an allegiance to fundamental fairness and the rule of law?
Even if the terms punishment and crime are inappropriate under the ide-
ological foundations of juvenile courts,217 should the concept of propor-
tionality and a sense of fairness still apply? Is a court a proper venue for
the process of treatment?
B. THE BASELINE: NEW YORK FAMILY COURT
In New York, the Family Court has original jurisdiction over proceed-
ings of delinquency, abuse or neglect of children. All matters in Family
Court are civil proceedings, not criminal, even where there is a factual
determination that a child committed an act that if committed by an adult
would constitute a criminal offense. This feature comports with the ther-
apeutic ideal and attempts to avoid the stigmatizing effects of a criminal
conviction.
The first issue to address is whether the case will formally move for-
ward in the juvenile justice system. Probation officers with the Depart-
ment of Probation ("Probation") act as initial gatekeepers to the formal
court procedures, much like the probation officers in the Chicago Juve-
nile Courts under Julian Mack.2 18 In a process called "adjustment," Pro-
bation has the authority to terminate the proceeding in favor of the child
before referring the case to the City's Law Department. 2 19 To complete
the adjustment process, probation must obtain the consent of the com-
plaining witness, and in some instances the complainant must consent to
an adjustment.220 If the complainant consents, then the charges are
dropped and may not be re-filed at a later time.221 In some situations,
§ 315.3(2). Significantly, an ACD does not involve monitoring of any sort, and does not
constitute a finding of delinquency.
216. Technically, an offense committed by a youth is classified as an act of delinquency.
Likewise, no punishments are meted out in juvenile court, at least in theory.
217. Though an interesting topic, and worthy of further consideration, my treatment of
this area is necessarily brief.
218. See supra notes 53-54, and accompanying text.
219. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACr § 308.1(1) (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2004). New York City's
Office of Corporate Counsel provides attorneys to represent the interests of the state in
juvenile proceedings.
220. Some government agencies, such as the New York City Housing Authority, em-
ploy a policy of never consenting to adjustment.
221. See, e.g., In re Kendra C., 507 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802-03 (1986).
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written approval of the court is required for adjustment. 222
The adjustment period may continue for sixty days, and may be ex-
tended by the court for an additional sixty days. 2 2 3 The adjustment pro-
cess is very similar to the treatment process, with the notable exception
that the court is not involved in adjustment. Also noteworthy is the statu-
tory time limit on the adjustment process. Hence, if we could imagine an
administrative agency model of treatment-one without the direct in-
volvement or authority of the court-it would probably look like the De-
partment of Probation in the adjustment process. If a case is not
adjusted, then Probation sends the case file and a recommendation to a
presenting agency of the government.
A Family Court action formally commences with the filing of a petition
by the government. 224 The Court appoints counsel to represent the best
interests of the child. 225 Parents are involved in the case at the earliest
possible time 226 and are represented by attorneys assigned by the
court.227 Probation plays a central role, both in coordinating services for
the child and in monitoring the child's progress during the pendency of
the case.
The child is informed of the charges contained in the petition, and the
child either admits or denies the allegations in the petition.228 Where the
child does not enter an admission, the court conducts a fact-finding hear-
ing to determine whether the child committed the act specified in the
222. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACT § 308.1(13). If, for example, the child has had a prior arrest or
if the incoming charge is a designated felony, the Department of Probation must obtain
approval from the Court prior to adjustment.
223. N.Y. JUD. CT. AcT § 308.1(9).
224. In New York City, juvenile delinquency petitions are "prosecuted" by the New
York City Office of Corporate Counsel. The actions are civil and thus are not handled by
the New York City District Attorney. When the government attorney receives the file, she
reviews the allegation to determine whether a legally sufficient cause of action has been
alleged. The file from Probation contains only information about the alleged offense, not
about the child's history and character. If the allegations meet a probable cause threshold,
the city attorney files a petition with the Family Court. In many cases, the petition will not
be filed for several weeks. In the interim, the child and his parent will be instructed to go
home and return to court on a future date.
225. The legal guardian-child relationship differs slightly from the attorney-client rela-
tionship, since, at times, the child's interests may take precedence over his wishes.
226. When a child is arrested or detained, the police must either "release the child to
the custody of his parents," N.Y. JUD. CT. ACT § 305.2(4)(a), or "forthwith and with all
reasonable speed take the child directly, and without his first being taken to the police
station house, to the family court located in the county in which the act ... was commit-
ted." § 305.2(4)(b). The police may interview the child before taking him to court, but
some debate exists as to whether the police are permitted to conduct an identification
procedure before taking the child to court. Compare In re Martin S., 429 N.Y.S.2d 1009,
1011 (1980) (police conducting show-up identification procedure at complainant's home
held improper), with In re Jerold Jabbar L., 537 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1989) (show up conducted at
a crime-scene held permissible).
227. Because the interests of the child and parents might conflict, each party is repre-
sented by independent counsel.
228. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACT §§ 320.4(1), 321.1(1). This process is the equivalent to a crimi-
nal court arraignment and entry of initial plea. The formal reading of the charges is usually
waived.
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petition.229 At this adversarial proceeding, the child can make motions
disputing the procedural or evidentiary basis of the petition, is repre-
sented by counsel, and has an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses and present a defense. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court makes a determination and adjourns the case for a dispositional
hearing.230
At the dispositional phase of the proceeding, Probation must prepare
an investigation, diagnostic assessment, and recommendation, including:
the history of the juvenile including previous conduct, the family sit-
uation, any previous psychological and psychiatric reports, school ad-
justment, previous social assistance provided by voluntary or public
agencies and the response of the juvenile to such assistance ...
mental capacity and achievement, emotional stability and mental
disabilities.2 31
The Family Court Act provides guidance for the judge in making a
finding at the conclusion of a dispositional hearing and provides a wide
range of discretion. Specifically, if, at the end of the dispositional hear-
ing, the judge determines that the child does not require "supervision,
treatment or confinement," then the petition is dismissed.232 Further, the
judge must impose the "least restrictive available alternative. '233
The court will often include the goals of the supervision, for example
obtaining a high school diploma, but the day-to-day monitoring of pro-
gress toward those goals is handled by the Department of Probation. Va-
rious providers supply the court, or Probation, with educational
placements, substance abuse treatment programs, parenting classes and
after-school programs. All play a significant role in the diagnosis and
monitoring of the child's progress. The probation officer frequently acts
as a liaison between the service providers and the court, although the
service provider will report directly to the court on occasion.
In sum, the structure of New York's Family Court provides a view to
some of the issues facing the problem-solving courts while the Family
Court statute relies on a treatment theory for its foundation, but practice
in the Family Court seems based on a punitive theory. The drafters of
New York's Family Court Act took great pains to create a court separate
from the adult criminal court, yet the day to day operations of the courts
appear remarkably similar. Thus, the child receives many of the procedu-
ral rights that are only relevant in a system based on punishment the-
229. N.Y. JUD. CT. Act § 345.
230. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACr §§ 350.3, 350.4.
231. N.Y. JUD. CT. AcT § 351.1(1). The report presented by Probation is commonly
referred to as an Investigation and Recommendation (I & R).
232. N.Y. JuD. CT. ACT § 352.1(2).
233. N.Y. JUD. CT. Ac-r § 352.2(2)(a). In specific designated felony cases, the court
must consider restrictive placement. I have omitted reference to those sections, and in-
cluded only the sections relevant to the Juvenile Intervention Court.
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ory,234 including assistance of counsel, notice of the allegations, the
opportunity to make motions, and the right to remain silent, while the
State establishes the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. The severity
of the offense should not make a difference under a treatment theory, but
as a practical matter, the nature of the allegations controls much of the
process.
Three identifiable defects emerge in an examination of the way the
court functions.2 35 First, the process is remarkably similar to a criminal
proceeding. In reading through the Family Court Act, it is apparent that
the legislature distinguished between the juvenile and the criminal justice
systems. Although the procedures are roughly analogous, the statutes
utilize different language in an effort to separate the two systems. For
example, the petition is equivalent to a complaint or indictment, the fact-
finding hearing looks like a trial, and the disposition is analogous to a
sentencing. The attempt at differentiation has largely failed. The attor-
neys representing the government and the child seem to have fallen into
the roles of their institutional counterparts in criminal court, and, unfor-
tunately, the child gets the role of the defendant. One of the most dam-
aging aspects of this criminalization of the process is the routine request
for a pre-dispositional "secure placement," the criminal court equivalent
of preventative detention. The removal of the child from the home can
have severe consequences. 236 For a casual observer, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between criminal court and Family Court.
Second, the court is often unable to obtain the information that it re-
quires to make a critical decision. In case after case, the judge asks for an
update or for information on a specific issue, and in case after case, the
information pathway suffers a clog of one sort or another. 237 In many
cases, this informational sclerosis results because no one from the specific
service provider appears in court; in others, the person in court has no
personal knowledge of the facts of the case. From the perspective of the
service provider, the amount of in-court time requires a choice between
staffing the treatment center or the courtroom. 238 Some have designated
234. This, of course, is due to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and its progeny. See supra
notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
235. Although there are other criticisms of the Family Court, I describe these three
because the Juvenile Intervention Court appears to offer solutions.
236. One non-obvious effect can be described as a sequentiality effect: once the child is
in custody, he is less likely to be released with each passing court appearance. The sequen-
tiality effect has been described by Professor Peggy Cooper Davis in another context. See
Peggy Cooper Davis & Guatam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk; Sequential-
ity, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 146 (1995).
237. It is possible to create two sub-categories of information deficiency. In one, the
information exists but does not make its way to the courtroom. In the other the informa-
tion does not exist. Usually, the information does not exist because the request for the
information was not properly transmitted or received. If information is analogous to a
circulatory blood flow, the judge, as the brain, remains distressed because of both arterial
and venous failure.
238. Other Family Courts have experienced this problem. In an interview with the au-
thor, the clerk at the Monroe County Family Court opined that some treatment providers
would not accept cases because they were not compensated for their in-court time. Most
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court liaisons, but those people have only second-hand, and often incom-
plete, information.
Third, in order to receive services or treatment, children often must
travel significant distances with their parents. The trip to court can be an
all-day experience, especially when traveling from neighborhoods further
away from the central courts. This geographical discrimination takes the
heaviest toll on those least able to pay-the children.
C. THE JUVENILE INTERVENTION COURT
1. JIC in Theory
The Juvenile Intervention Court operated under the guidance of the
Center for Court Innovation, the experimental wing of the New York
Court system, accepting a limited number of cases based on certain crite-
ria, and providing local services, treatment and monitoring. 239 Some
cases started at the JIC and others were transferred from the downtown
Family Court. Front-end cases originated in the JIC. The police gave the
child and parent a summons, or desk appearance ticket (DAT), returna-
ble to the JIC if the case met certain general criteria, 240 including whether
the youth lived within the catchment area and whether the charge was a
drug-related or low level, non-violent offense. 241
Cases that began at the central Family Court were transferred to JIC
either as a condition of the youth's release or as part of the disposition.
These were referred to as back-end cases. The judge at the central Family
Court might release a youth on the condition that the youth report to the
JIC for a clinical evaluation. If the child lived in the JIC catchment area,
the Family Court judge at times included participation in the JIC as a
condition of a disposition of probation or required a child to participate
in the JIC program as a condition of parole while a case was pending in
Family Court.
treatment providers receive compensation from Medicaid and are not compensated for
court appearances.
239. The JIC accepted only children who live in and around the court, and who were
living at home (not in a detention or placement facility). The jurisdiction of the court
corresponded to the boundaries of three police precincts in upper Manhattan. Roughly the
area extended from the East River to Morningside Park, from 96th Street to 127th Street,
and also included the area east of 5th Avenue up to 145th Street.
240. A New York Police Department Command Order directed officers to divert eligi-
ble cases to the JIC. As long as the criteria were met, the case must be referred to the JIC,
thus there was no discretion in police referrals-in theory. Given the low number of cases
at the JIC, however, it was uncertain whether officers in the field followed this directive.
Once the child returned on the DAT, he was interviewed by Probation. He was informed
of the availability of services and asked to consent to be interviewed by a clinician in order
to determine eligibility. If the child and parent did not consent, then the case was sent to
Probation at the downtown Family Court. Once a case was referred to Corp. Counsel
downtown, however, there was no possibility for prejudice since Corp. Counsel did not
have access to information from Probation.
241. The focus on low-level offenses did not appear to be related to a treatment philos-




If the child (or parent) consented to participate in the program, the on-
site clinician conducted an in-depth interview with the child. This infor-
mation was shared with the probation officer, who then made an initial
decision about whether to adjust the case or to file a recommendation
with the government attorneys. The general legal procedures are the
same as in Family Court. If the case was not adjusted, the City Law De-
partment analyzed the legal basis of the case, and filed a petition where
appropriate. The child was assigned counsel and informed of the charges.
Where there was an admission or a fact-finding, the judge ultimately had
discretion to impose a dispositional order. Initially, neither government
attorneys nor counsel for the child had access to the clinical information.
The JIC process deviated from standard Family Court practice with the
introduction of a treatment court process. Concurrent with the legal pro-
cess, the child engaged in a clinical process aimed at identifying and meet-
ing the specific needs of the child. The process was divided into an initial
assessment period, three treatment phases and an aftercare program.
The initial assessment period included a psycho-social interview with the
youth, drug testing, educational assessment and a program orientation.
The initial assessment culminated with the formulation of an Individual-
ized Strengthening Plan (ISP). Like the drug courts, the ISP formed the
basis of a contract between the child and the court. The contract included
a detailed description of the system of rewards and sanctions. It de-
scribed in detail what is expected initially, and also provided for future
adaptation based on changed circumstances, much like the reward and
sanction system of the drug treatment courts.
The first phase lasted for approximately two months and addressed be-
havioral changes, such as school attendance, drug abstinence, and aware-
ness of interpersonal dynamics. The second phase lasted for another two
months, and focused on personal development, including strengthening
relationships and improving critical thinking. The third phase introduced
leadership skills. The aftercare program facilitated a continuation of the
skills learned in the earlier phases.
Each phase included a description of the goals that should be met in
order to progress to the next phase. The frequency of court appearances
dropped from bi-monthly in the first phase to monthly in phases two and
three. Participants were expected to improve school attendance, to per-
form community service, and to interact with the court's computer net-
work. Each phase also included a drug treatment component.
Depending on the degree of involvement, the child may attended a day
treatment center, an after-school treatment program or weekly counsel-
ing sessions. All participants were drug tested.
The JIC theory extended the period between the fact-finding and the
ultimate disposition of the case. The ISP became the basis of a contract
between the court and the child. A team of legal and clinical personnel
monitored compliance and performance of the ISP. A child who success-
fully completed the program received some consideration in the form of a
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less onerous final disposition, but the specific quid pro quo varied from
case to case, and unlike the drug treatment courts, there were no up-front
promises as to the eventual legal outcome. In this respect, the JIC judge
held significantly more discretionary authority than even the drug treat-
ment court judges, who were at least facially constrained by the contrac-
tual promises made at the time the defendant entered the drug treatment
court.
Critical reviews occurred at weekly meetings, called "staffings," where
some of the interested parties gathered to discuss the progress of partici-
pants in the JIC. Staffings were envisioned as a collaborative exchange of
information between all of the interested parties involved in the case, in-
cluding the judge, the law guardian, the government attorneys, Probation,
the court attorney, the clinical case manager, and the court coordinator.
The parents and children, however, were not included in the round table.
For each case, the Court Administrator prepared a Participant Status
Report. Probation provided information about the initial intake, follow-
up contact and school attendance. The clinical case manager shared in-
formation from the initial screening and follow-up meetings. The court
coordinator initially assessed the various onsite programs and suggested
possible matches, and then reported on the child's progress. The goal was
to reach a consensus on a course of action. If, however, no consensus was
reachable, then the judge made the decision. The court coordinator was
responsible for recording the result of the staffing, and each party had the
opportunity to review the court coordinator's summary.
The state-of-the-art computer technology integrated staff activities and
provided a unique learning experience for participants in the JIC. For the
JIC staff, the computer system provided access to clinical and case infor-
mation for each participant. Different levels of access insured that infor-
mation was only available to authorized personnel. The ability of
numerous users to contribute to the online case file allowed for access to
information even when the specific person was not available. Each par-
ticipant was assigned a user-name and password for access to the JIC
network. Every ISP included computer skills and literacy training, and, in
most cases, the participant logged-in to the network weekly or performed
other discrete tasks.
2. JIC in Practice
The preceding sections sketched the operation of the JIC in theory. In
practice, however, several issues prevented a smooth implementation of
this theory. Institutional loyalties prevented the type of true collabora-
tion envisioned by the problem-solving court theory. Cases were not re-
ferred in the numbers anticipated, resulting in excess capacity. Finally,
indicative of the first two issues, cases that made it to the JIC were of
such a low level as to eliminate any possible claim to efficiency.
By institutional loyalties, I refer to the sense of identity felt toward
institutions to which one maintains affiliations. Part of the problem-solv-
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ing court philosophy was to shed institutional identities and loyalties in
favor of a new identity. So in theory, the government attorneys should
feel a greater sense of loyalty to the problem-solving court than to the
prosecutor's office. Defense lawyers, likewise, should adapt their role to
place the success of the court above the traditional adversarial represen-
tation of their clients. Probation officers and treatment providers should
owe allegiance to the court rather than to their respective agencies.
But this shift in loyalty did not happen. Tensions, on occasion, ran high
between government attorneys and law guardians. These tensions re-
flected fundamental differences in priorities of the major institutions in-
volved. From a policy view, New York City agencies prioritized the
safety of the community over other concerns, such as rehabilitation and
treatment.242 This policy was not amended to suit the purposes or func-
tions of the JIC, so representative attorneys from the government had no
authority to deviate from standard office policies. Thus the collaborative
nature of the problem-solving court project is frustrated by the substance
of the policy and by the lack of discretion accorded to the government's
representative at JIC. There was not much reason to collaborate when
options appeared to have been evaluated only in terms of community
safety and where the city's lawyer had no ability to change policy. 243
Law guardians fared no better, as these attorneys were not assigned
exclusively to JIC. Although the Legal Aid Society originally assigned
two attorneys to act as law guardians for JIC cases, the low number of
cases precluded assigning attorneys permanently and exclusively to the
JIC. Although the same attorneys handled most of JIC cases, the attor-
neys also maintained caseloads in other courts. Further, participation in
the problem-solving court involved significant issues for lawyers repre-
senting the children accused of delinquency.244 Although the technical
nature of the client relationship differed slightly from the attorney-client
relationship in drug treatment courts, similar concerns arose for the attor-
neys at JIC.245 Moreover, the incentives to capitulate were dramatically
weakened by the government's staunch position; other lawyers were less
242. I intend this as a value-neutral statement. Reasonable minds disagree on whether
the proper valuation has occurred in fixing community safety as the overarching priority,
but the unmistakable consequence is a frustration of the alternative treatment programs
such as the JIC.
243. Ironically, or perhaps intentionally, the front-line negotiator's lack of discretion
results in a relatively strong negotiating position. For a detailed discussion, see generally,
ROBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING (2000); ROGER FISHER & WILIAM URY, GETTING
TO YES (1991).
244. In a thoughtful article, Mae Quinn highlighted the transformation necessary to
operate in the problem-solving court model. See generally, Mae Quinn, Whose Team am I
on Anyway: Musings of a Public Defender in Drug Court, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 37 (2000).
245. Attorneys representing children in Family Court are appointed ad litem to re-
present the best interests of the child. Attorneys representing adults in criminal court re-
present the person. The guardian ad litem stands in a similar place to a court operating
under parens patriae. The distinction arises when the client's wishes differ from what the
attorney considers to be the best course of action. With juveniles, the attorney's better
judgment should prevail.
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likely to engage in a collaborative process if it was perceived to be one-
sided.
Probation, on the other hand, had the right idea. From the formative
stages of the court, Probation assigned an individual officer to handle all
of the cases from JIC. In addition, the person selected was relatively se-
nior and appeared to have the confidence of her supervisors to make dis-
cretionary decisions. Permanent placement at JIC fostered a sense of
loyalty to JIC and expanded the sense of allegiance to the problem-solv-
ing principles. Clinical advisors and treatment providers were also per-
manently assigned to JIC. But these two groups were not sufficient to
establish real collaboration, especially given the hierarchy in the power
structure of the court system, where attorneys held the positions of great-
est influence. 246
3. Experimentalist Structures and Solutions: Policy Meetings and
Back-End Cases
Structural components of JIC included experimentalist ideas on both a
micro level and on a macro level.247 On a micro level, the cases were
managed through an experimentalist process. The data collection system
provided the interested parties with information relevant to treatment de-
cisions. The "staffing" meetings provided a forum for the interested par-
ties (lawyers, probation, treatment providers, administrators and the
judge) to decide whether to adjust the treatment program. On a macro
level, the court was managed through monthly policy planning meetings.
At these meetings, interested parties reviewed the success of the court
and decided whether to adjust the policies of the court. Staffings and
policy meetings were experimentalist because the practices remained in a
state of flux, and best practices were determined through a group consen-
sus and reference to monitored data.
The most vivid example of the success of the experimentalist model
occurred several months after the JIC opened. After a few months of
operation, JIC had only a handful of cases. Either early projections of
case numbers were too low or cases that should have been referred to JIC
were taken directly to the downtown courts. Both scenarios required de-
termining why the cases were not coming in and how to change that fact.
But regardless of the cause of the case shortage, JIC had significant un-
used capacity to treat and monitor cases.
To resolve this, JIC administrators solicited referrals from the central
Family Court, wherein judges at the downtown Family Court could refer
cases to JIC for treatment and monitoring. The prototypical case in-
246. If the tables were turned, and the attorneys were operating in a collaborative mode
and probation and treatment personnel were not, then the hierarchical forces could be
used to induce compliance with problem-solving court principles.
247. By experimentalist, I refer to principles of democratic experimentalism, as de-




volved a child who lived within JIC's Harlem catchment area and who
was under probationary supervision. The day-to-day and week-to-week
treatment decisions were handled at JIC, but the judge downtown re-
tained jurisdiction over the case. If circumstances required the imposi-
tion of a severe sanction, the downtown judge would take the necessary
action, whereas the JIC judge would administer low-level sanctions. For
example, the downtown court would handle any violation of probation
proceeding or any determination about the child's placement in a secure
detention facility. Cases that originated downtown were dubbed "back-
end" cases, as opposed to the "front-end" cases that originated at JIC.
Accepting "back-end cases" resolved the excess capacity issue, but
more critically, it also resolved some of the theoretical difficulties
presented by the problem-solving courts.248 By splitting the treatment
decisions from the ultimate imposition of sanctions, back-end cases at JIC
avoid, to a large extent, the problems of neutrality and fairness discussed
earlier. Assume a case where the treatment has not been successful.
Front-end cases followed the model of most problem-solving courts
where the same judge that had been monitoring the treatment process
decided whether the process had failed and what sanction to impose. In
back-end cases, however, the case was referred to a different judge if the
treatment program failed, and the ultimate decision as to whether to im-
pose a sanction for program failure was made by a judge who was not
intimately involved in the treatment process itself.
Critically, this structure ameliorates concerns about fairness and neu-
trality and provides a line of demarcation for the application of the adver-
sarial process and procedural protections. The collaborative process and
relaxed attention to procedure can be applied at JIC, whereas the adver-
sarial process and greater attention to procedure should apply in the
downtown court. The shift reflects the nature of the proceeding-when
the proceeding turns "against" the child, then the case should be removed
to the downtown court where a greater degree of procedural protections
apply.
The application of this model to the drug courts and other courts would
be even more poignant. In theory, both JIC and the downtown Family
Court are problem-solving courts, and neither court has jurisdiction to
"punish" children, even for delinquent acts. But where the problem-solv-
ing court is appended to the criminal court, the line between treatment
and punishment can be more clearly drawn. When the defendant enters
the "treatment" phase of the problem-solving court, procedural protec-
tions should be relaxed and the collaborative approach followed. But at
the point when treatment is deemed to have failed, and the alternative
punishment sought to be imposed, then procedural protections should ap-
248. Excess capacity and the institutional difficulties described above remained signifi-
cant bariers to the long-term success of the JIC. The significance of the back-end case
solution is that it resolved the tension created when the same judge wears both a "treat-
ment hat" and a "punishment hat."
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ply and an adversarial model followed. Moreover, the termination or
revocation process should occur in a different court with a different
judge. To put it simply, the same judge should not play good cop and
then play bad cop.
Separating the "treatment" phase and the "punishment" phase of the
process to different courts is the exact remedy suggested by the court in
the Alexander case.249 The specific argument in Alexander focused on the
separation of powers issue, but separating the treatment and punishment
phases of the drug court resolves the separation of powers concern and
increases the appearance of fairness and neutrality.250
D. LEARNING FROM JIC: PRACTICAL REFORMS
1. Separate Adversarial and Collaborative Processes
The adversarial nature of a termination should be recognized in light of
the significant liberty interests at stake. This should not be a mere pro
forma or summary hearing, but rather, should include all of the due pro-
cess safeguards applicable in traditional courts, such as notice, the assis-
tance of counsel, an opportunity to confront witnesses and a neutral
magistrate. By entrenching the procedural safeguards, drug courts and
other problem-solving courts can avoid repeating the experiences of the
juvenile courts that led to the Gault decision.251 At minimum, the defen-
dant should be informed that he will be terminated from the program and
the specific reasons for the termination. He should have access to inde-
pendent counsel, i.e., an attorney that is not affiliated with the treatment
court. The defendant's attorney in treatment court, like the court itself,
should be labeled as an interested party. In essence, the attorneys and
judges of the treatment court should be separate from the attorneys and
judges in the adversarial court. It makes no sense to have a part-time
collaborative effort, or a partially adversarial proceeding. Separating col-
laborative and adversarial proceedings should foster the respective roles
of each model.
2. Sanitize the Appearance of Bias
In separating the adversarial and collaborative process, we might
achieve superior positions for both. The process of referring a case to
another court for a termination hearing arose in the Alexander opinion
and is evident in the JIC back-end cases. Both models suggest that this
can be practically implemented.252
I disagree with the Alexander court's placement of the burden on the
defendant to request an impartial judge. The concurring opinion recog-
nizes that the treatment court is an interested party and that the better
249. State v. Alexander, 48 P.3d 110 (Okla. 2000).
250. Id. at 114.
251. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
252. Alexander, 48 P.3d at 111.
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practice would be for a neutral judge to conduct the hearing. The burden
should be placed on the party that is best situated to absorb the cost. If
the default position was to send the case to another judge for the termina-
tion hearing, then the defendant could avoid the Catch-22 situation of
requesting the recusal of the judge about to decide his fate.253 This pro-
cedure also vests the court with the appearance of neutrality and fairness.
The JIC back-end cases are closer to what I envision as a model for
separating the collaborative treatment courts from the adversarial tradi-
tional courts. Because the violation of probation proceeding occurs at
the central Family Court, and not at the JIC, the two processes are effec-
tively separated.
E. THE FUTURE OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
The specialized problem-solving courts fill the space created by nega-
tive accountability. The drug courts, mental health courts and domestic
violence courts, just to name a few, focus on large scale social problems
that are difficult to resolve. The failure of various agencies has led to the
dumping of all social problems into the lap of the courts.
1. Lessons from the Juvenile Courts
The experience of the juvenile courts provides an historical example of
the nature of the impending crisis of legitimacy. The current incarnations
of the problem-solving courts are over-driven by the good intentions of
the charismatic individuals leading the charge, and there may be evidence
of a moderate increase in efficiency. But the increased efficiency does
not account for the change in institutional structure and the risk for crisis.
Toying with the internal structure of our constitutional system does not
come without risk. But tinkering with the system might be necessary
when other options have failed to produce acceptable results. If the
problem-solving courts represent a new form of governance, and I believe
that they do, they should seek to repair the system, not change the sys-
tem, because the replacement might prove to be at odds with not only our
constitutional structure, but also with democratic principles and ideals of
justice.
Just as the concepts of punishment and treatment are incompatible on
a theoretical level, so it is with the practical manifestations of those theo-
ries. The adversarial and collaborative processes do not mix and should
be segregated where possible. The juvenile courts started with a pure
treatment theory, but gradually introduced aspects of punishment theory.
The problem-solving courts, on the other hand, start in the punishment
world and seek to introduce concepts from treatment theory. In this re-
gard, it does not seem to matter much whether we add water to vinegar
253. Moreover, some drug treatment courts require participants to waive the right to
bring a motion for recusal of the treatment court judge from decisions involving termina-
tion from the program. See Waiver of Right to Recusal, Escambia County, Florida, availa-
ble at http://www.spa.ward.american.edu/justice/publications/pensacola/awaiver.htm.
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or vinegar to water, the two will not mix. The entanglement of the courts
in the intersection of treatment and punishment forces the court to as-
sume a role that it is not, by constitutional design or practical reality,
equipped to perform.
The tragedy of the juvenile court story is the inability of the juvenile
justice system to maintain allegiance to its original theoretical underpin-
nings. Once elements of the treatment theory were implemented, a re-
version to punishment theory resulted in an unfair, unpredictable, non-
neutral regime lacking stability and ultimately, legitimacy. When the ju-
venile courts fell into this chasm, the Supreme Court rescued the exis-
tence of the courts by re-imposing procedural protections on juvenile
justice systems that had become, de facto, punishment-based criminal sys-
tems. My warning is that the drug courts, and other problem-solving
courts, are headed for the same fate that befell the juvenile courts.
2. The Legitimacy Deficit
Legitimacy, the entitlement to exercise authority and the obligation to
obey, can be separated into rational, traditional and charismatic bases.
The rational and traditional bases are connected, and in the context of a
court, are related to the concepts of fairness, neutrality and ritualism.
Problem-solving courts do not promote fairness, neutrality or ritualism,
and therefore cause a decrease in the legitimacy of the court. Trades of
due process protections for the sake of efficiency should be reexamined
and recalculated in a manner that takes the court's expenditure of legiti-
macy capital into account. When such calculation is made, the cost of the
marginal gains in efficiency will be too high to justify the loss of
legitimacy.
3. Experimentalism's Capacity to Adapt
The JIC operated as a local branch of the centralized family court in
New York City. The experimentalist structure of the JIC allowed it to
adapt to a structure that naturally bifurcated the treatment and punish-
ment roles of the court. While the structural change in the JIC was not
undertaken to increase the legitimacy of the court, that effect was ob-
tained. Further, small scale changes that I suggest for the JIC decrease
the legitimacy costs of the problem-solving courts without substantially
affecting the efficiency of the courts, and therefore offer superior
results.254
The criminal courts remain the venue of last resort for many social is-
sues, yet significant criminal law reform remains too risky for the political
branches. The judiciary is left to cope with the task of sorting out whom
to punish and whom to treat. From a realist perspective, the problem
solving model is here to stay, and the relevant issue is not whether the
254. The JIC has recently adopted a wholesale restructuring, based, in part, on person-
nel changes. Hopefully, the new structures will address concerns of legislation, as well as
the practical considerations described here.
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problem-solving courts should be adopted, but whether existing struc-
tures can be exploited to maximize the legitimacy of these courts.
The problem-solving courts present the possibility to mold the judiciary
into a more reactive and responsive institution, yet they also present the
potential for a loss of the time-gained legitimacy of the courts. As exam-
ples of experimentalist structures, the problem-solving courts possess in-
ternal mechanisms for mutation to more efficient or pragmatic forms.
Problem-solving courts should use this feature to adapt in a manner that
maximizes the legitimacy of the court. As the problem-solving courts be-
come entrenched, adoption of the reforms that I suggest will increase the
courts' legitimacy. JIC offers an opportunity to observe these suggestions
in practice, and demonstrates the capacity of the problem-solving courts
to adapt in a manner that adds legitimacy. As such, it presents a model
worthy of replication in other problem-solving courts.
The move to separate functions of problem-solving courts might be la-
beled as a reformation of problem-solving courts as administrative agen-
cies. Questions arise as to whether an existing agency-such as the
Department of Probation-already perform the same function, and
whether the new "drug court agency" operates as an arm of the executive
branch or should somehow retain ties to the judiciary? If there is duplica-
tion with the function of problem-solving courts and the mandate of pro-
bation departments, then the overwhelming adoption of drug courts
suggests that probation is not working in practice. Further, given the high
degree of influence that prosecuting agencies hold over the drug courts, it
is no great step to explicitly label what are currently de facto branches of
the executive. Recognizing the importance of separating the executive
and judicial branches, several State legislatures have included similar pro-
visions in their drug court enactment statutes. 255 And while this bicamer-
alization, at first blush, seems inefficient, the experience of the JIC
suggests that it is a workable solution. Where lacking, I also suggest that
problem-solving courts seek legislative enactment, so that the charter of
the court derives from the legislature, not the judicial branch.25 6 Finally,
problem-solving courts should increase the degree of transparency in the
decision making process by providing a rationale for the decision, and
appellate review should be expanded to include treatment decisions, 257
with the same type of deference as is accorded to administrative agencies.
V. CONCLUSION
The problem-solving court model alters the traditional role of the judge
and the court in order to address issues of drug abuse, juvenile delin-
quency, mental health and other areas where criminal law and social pol-
255. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT., tit. 22, § 471.1 (2003).
256. Currently most states have specific enabling legislation, but others, such as New
York, do not.
257. See Dorf, Indeterminacy, supra note 15, at 954-960 (suggesting a system of appel-
late review for the problem-solving courts).
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icy intersect. While drug treatment courts are usually recognized as the
most prevalent form of problem-solving court, the juvenile courts imple-
mented a hundred years ago shared the same core set of principles. As
such, the history of the juvenile courts, including the challenges to legiti-
macy, should serve as a cautionary tale for the drug courts and other
newer models of problem-solving courts.
So my message here is first one of trepidation. A state mandated treat-
ment program has a tendency to yield disastrous results when mixed with
a punishment theory. In the juvenile courts, the theory was purely reha-
bilitative and yet punitive aspects crept into the court, ultimately destroy-
ing the treatment ideal. The problem-solving courts present an even
more audacious experiment: a state sanctioned treatment model within a
punitive model. Thus the objective potential for illegitimacy runs higher
for the drug treatment courts than for the juvenile courts.
My message is also one of practical success. As experimentalist struc-
tures, the problem-solving courts have the capacity to adapt in ways that
increase their legitimacy. Recognizing that the criminal context, with the
great power differentials among the interested parties, presents a less
than ideal application of democratic experimentalism, the model still
proves successful. The message should be that these courts, with their
collaborative structure, are inherently capable of self-reflection, monitor-
ing and adaptation.
Given the political intractability of the types of social problems ad-
dressed by problem-solving courts, the experimentalist spirit should be
embraced and congratulated, and if these courts are to succeed in the
future, that very same experimentalism must be used to continuously
adapt the court structure in ways that increase legitimacy.
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